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I. INTRODUCTION
 In fifteen years of teaching Corporations and Securities Regulation, and various 
seminars on business law, I have failed to give the subject of corporate social 
responsibility its due.  This is surprising because my interest in corporate social 
responsibility issues was a significant part of what led me to become a law professor. 
This interest in corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) took hold notwithstanding 
that I do not recall hearing much about the subject during law school.1  The omission 
is especially startling because I went to a self-consciously liberal law school committed 
to using law as an instrument of progressive social change.  But social welfare 
concerns were not manifest in my business law courses.  They were not then, and I 
would be surprised if they are now.  To paraphrase what Duncan Kennedy once told 
me, after the 1980s the public law curriculum inherited critical theory; the private 
law curriculum—markets. Hence, even twenty years after my graduation, it is still 
unlikely that law students learn much about corporate social responsibility in the 
basic business law courses. 
1. What led me to the CSR question was not my law studies, but my graduate studies.  Unlike many future 
business law professors, I did not head for a graduate economics department.  Instead, I completed three 
years of post-graduate study in a Ph.D. program in Yale University’s Department of Renaissance 
Studies.  As even a brief survey of the period reveals, these were formative years in the development of 
banking and trade, cities and markets, and power struggles between commercial, political, and religious 
institutions.  This graduate work has led me to a socio-economic perspective on corporate law and 
market regulation—a perspective in which firms and market participants are appropriately analyzed 
through a broad cultural lens.
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 This article considers the explanations for this omission and its significance for 
American legal education, future corporate lawyers, and society.  It begins with a 
discussion of practical impediments to teaching CSR as part of the law school 
curriculum.  It then provides a brief history of CSR—which is increasingly being 
referred to as corporate social “accountability.”2  Next it discusses the traditional 
Corporations and Securities Regulation courses, noting where CSR issues could 
easily be integrated into each course’s traditional framework.  Its final section 
proposes that the subject of corporate disclosure or “corporate transparency” can be 
used as a bridge between the traditional curriculum and the study of CSR.  The 
article’s thesis is that curricular reform in the area of CSR is crucially important to 
the future of legal education, as well as our society’s broader wellbeing.  
 As successful corporate lawyers appreciate, we live in a world where hard laws 
and regulations operate in tandem with softer, more eclectic forms of setting 
standards.  At the same time, corporations operate in an environment of increasingly 
global competition and constant media exposure.  In this complex environment, the 
penalties arising from reputational damage are increasing, and the financial rewards 
from running a genuinely disciplined, principled enterprise are likely to increase. 
Corporate lawyers will have an increasingly central role in promoting the benefits 
companies can garner from CSR in terms of supporting ethical leadership, greater 
corporate transparency, and civil society capacity building.  Facing these challenges, 
corporate leaders will increasingly need their legal advisors to help them build wealth 
for the long term.  
 For twenty-five years, law schools have been gearing up to meet this challenge. 
Perhaps because law is so technical, business law education has remained essentially 
micro-analytic in its orientation.  And while law schools are struggling to keep their 
students up-to-date with the growing technical detail in the law, they have also been 
criticized for falling short in skills development—in relation to fact-finding, 
negotiating, and drafting, for example.3 Helping law students synthesize different 
areas of law and cultivate judgment and vision, are even larger challenges. But these 
challenges are ones law schools must take seriously in order to help future corporate 
lawyers prepare for their role in counseling ethical corporations. 
II. PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO TEACHING CORPORATE SOCIAL   
 RESPONSIBILITY
 Limited time is the first challenge to teaching CSR.  In the basic Corporations 
and Securities Regulation courses, I feel a significant responsibility to help my 
students prepare for the nuts and bolts of corporate and securities law practice. 
2. I use the term corporate social responsibility herein because corporate social accountability is of such 
recent vintage.  However, the latter term is probably more appropriate because CSR is about companies 
taking full responsibility for their costs and the resources they consume/depend upon.  “Accountability” 
ref lects this concern nicely; it also captures the emphasis on transparency in CSR studies. 
3. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Report of the Task 
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, at ch. 7 (Robert MacCrate ed., 
1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html.
820
GLOBALIZATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Corporate law is especially doctrinally challenging because it incorporates and builds 
upon several areas of law—contract, property, tort, trust, civil procedure, professional 
responsibility, and federal securities law, for example.  Furthermore, corporate legal 
rules and judicial opinions make little sense to students unfamiliar with basic 
principles of corporate finance.  Absent such financial understanding, students 
cannot appreciate the judicial analysis of mergers, assets sales, financings, and 
recapitalizations set forth in the case law.4  Hence a review of basic financial principles 
is part of the syllabus.  It seems essential to proceed slowly in the basic business law 
courses, to involve students in sifting through the legal doctrines as applied to precise 
transactional settings.  In this fashion students can begin to prepare themselves for 
the live version.  Nevertheless, this immersive approach to the basic Corporations 
and Securities Regulation courses leaves little time for bigger policy discussions, 
including those relevant to CSR. 
 The traditional answer is to leave broader synthesis and in-depth analysis to 
seminars.  Along these lines, in the spring of 2008 I developed a seminar focusing on 
W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”).  The course focused on Grace’s problems with 
disclosure and legal compliance across a broad range of subject areas, including the 
company’s dealings with the SEC, the EPA, OSHA, and the Department of Justice.5 
It also focused on the relative roles of private litigation and civil and criminal 
enforcement.  
 But seminars present their own, distinct problems for legal education.  Most law 
students focus principally on preparing themselves for the professional challenges 
they foresee upon graduation.  Rather than taking seminars, which would deepen 
their understanding of the law, they often prefer to expand their knowledge base in 
the hope of lighter lifting come bar time.  Second, students may shy away from 
taking seminars because they fear the additional work or the closer scrutiny associated 
with them, or that the success they have had on traditional short-answer exams may 
not carry over to seminar work, which typically requires not only consistent class 
participation but also the completion of a research paper.  If many law students do 
not take seminars, then leaving crucially important subjects to be covered in them is 
problematic.  What is and is not included in the basic business law courses is therefore 
of great importance for legal education and future corporate lawyers. 
 Another impediment to teaching CSR-related seminars is the absence of 
innovative, up-to-date course materials.  This is a general problem in the business 
law area, but a more acute problem with respect to CSR, because less attention has 
been devoted to the subject.  Of course, the development of new course materials and 
pedagogical approaches takes substantial time.  But law schools do not encourage 
professors to invest substantial time in developing new teaching materials.  Research 
grant funding is rarely made available for this purpose.  Teaching materials, no 
4. For an excellent casebook in this area, see William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance: Cases and 
Materials (6th ed. 2008).
5. See Indictment ¶¶ 185–190, United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. CR 05-07-
M-DWM); Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 521, 524 
(2006).
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matter how innovative, are not regarded as having the importance or prestige 
attributed to scholarship.  This inhibits innovation in the law school curriculum as it 
relates to CSR.  In sum, the absence of CSR-related course materials remains a 
problem for legal education, especially given law schools’ commitment to training 
the next century’s global corporate legal advisors. 
 Nevertheless, market forces, including the market for law degrees, may lead to 
greater attentiveness to CSR.6  Law schools are reckoning with globalization both at 
the curricular and the institutional level, and the two are related.  In an increasingly 
mobile, interconnected world, law students are becoming more sensitive to the need 
to think globally.  In this respect, CSR (perhaps under the rubric of “sustainability”) 
may become a hot issue that law schools will use to distinguish themselves.  Workers’ 
demands for fair wages and safe conditions; public outcry over climate change; 
tradeoffs between privacy rights, information possessed by corporations, and national 
security; competing free speech claims on the part of corporate employers, employees, 
and investors—all of these issues are part of the CSR analysis.  And lawyers familiar 
with corporate law will be at the center of all these controversies.  Companies like 
Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft, and their lawyers, have learned hard lessons about 
the relationship between profits, human rights, and politics from doing business in 
China.7  Mining and extractive industries, and their lawyers, have grappled with 
these issues, across the globe, for decades.8  The challenges for multinational 
enterprises and their legal advisors are increasing exponentially; so will the costs for 
lawyers who are unprepared to address them.  These forces should lead law schools 
to promote the study of CSR as part of their curricula. 
III. FROM CSR TO CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
 A. Academic Boundaries 
 Another challenge to CSR’s f lourishing as a subject of study is that it has not 
been recognized as a discrete academic field—neither in law schools or more generally. 
Many academic and graduate programs touch upon the subject of businesses’ and 
business leaders’ status in the broader, socio-political environment.  Such academic 
programs include management, economics, finance, sociology, history, philosophy, 
cultural studies, and law.  But each of these areas has an alternative focus.  The 
discussion of CSR is peripheral in each case.   
6. For a wonderful history of the development of legal education, see generally William P. LaPiana, 
Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education (1994).
7. See Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Joins Multi Stakeholder Initiative on 
Internet and Human Rights ( Jan. 23, 2007), available at www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?/
lang=e&id=ENGPOL300012007.
8. See, e.g., Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence and International Law, 
36 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 331 (2004).
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 Ref lecting its cross-disciplinary nature and “belated” academic status, CSR-
oriented scholarship has yet to reach its full academic maturity.9  Its topical boundaries 
are f luid and its methodologies are still evolving—and acceptance of change in the 
academy is slow.  Senior scholars in the area of CSR are not sufficiently numerous as 
to be readily available as mentors.  Younger scholars, laboring without tenure (and 
hence needful of the approval of their academic superiors) might still be taking a risk 
by focusing on CSR-related issues.10  
 Outside of the legal academy, there is more interest in CSR studies.  After the 
serial financial crises of the last decade, business schools are giving greater attention 
to the subject of “ethical leadership.”11  Accelerating signs of climate change; 
continued instances of high profile, international corporate corruption; and 
consumers’ expressed preference for products that are less exploitative of the 
environment, for example, are fostering a reorientation in business schools’ curricula 
towards greater attentiveness to CSR issues.12 
 In addition, many universities are establishing new academic centers focusing on 
“sustainability.”  These centers typically offer some combination of engineering, 
design, architecture, environmental science, consumer behavior, and public policy.13 
As such, they are likely to fuel academic innovation in areas related to CSR.  The 
9. For an exceptional review of developments in the CSR area, written by academics in different fields, see 
Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of the 
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & Contemp. Probs. 9 
(1999).
10. For an extraordinarily innovative critique from one of the leading scholars in the field, see, for example, 
Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias As Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Failure of Transparency, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1035, 1062 (2003); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of 
Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 829 (2004); Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American 
Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1258 (2004); Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom For Whom? Feminist Legal Theory 
and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 L. Contemp. Probs. 87 (2004).
11. The efforts of the Aspen Institute’s Program on Business and Society are targeted at this challenge.  See 
The Aspen Institute, Business and Society Program, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/
business-society/about-business-society/program (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).  Their mission statement 
asserts: 
  The Business and Society Program is dedicated to developing leaders for a sustainable 
global society.  Through dialogues and path-breaking research, we create opportunities for 
executives and educators to explore new pathways to sustainability and values-based 
leadership.  BSP’s websites, www.CasePlace.org and www.beyondgreypinstripes.org, are 
the leading sources of innovative curriculum in top business schools around the world.
 Id. 
12. Id.  Notably, there is no equivalent within the legal academy at this time.
13. See The Aspen Institute Center for Business Education, Sustainability Center Research Initiative, 
Phase I, http://www.aspencbe.org/teaching/sustainability.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) (providing a 
recent catalogue of such centers); The Aspen Institute, A Closer Look at Applied Sustainability 
Centers (2008), available at http://www.aspencbe.org/documents/Applied%20Sustainability%20
Centers%20Final.pdf (discussing the rise in the number of centers focused on applied sustainability); 
Claudia H. Deutsch, A Threat So Big, Academics Try Collaboration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2007, at A1 
(discussing growing collaboration between graduate school programs on issues of sustainability).
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Obama administration’s expressed commitment to using environmentally friendly 
technologies to rebuild infrastructure will also contribute to this greater awareness 
and cross-disciplinary academic f lourishing. 
 The United Nations is also taking action in areas related to CSR.14  In July 2005, 
Kofi Annan appointed John Ruggie to serve as the Special Representative to the 
Secretary General in the area of Business and Human Rights.15  (The business and 
human rights framework is occupying a significant part of the CSR agenda in the 
international sphere.)  This initiative on the part of the United Nations is having an 
influence on American universities in the area of CSR.  For example, together with 
Oxfam, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government recently co-hosted a consultation 
with Mr. Ruggie on the subject of non-judicial dispute resolution for human rights 
claims against international businesses.16  
 B. Legal History
 In developing an understanding of CSR, a brief look at legal history is in order.17 
This history sheds light on the relative under-emphasis on CSR in corporate law.  
 Because CSR focuses on the conduct and influence of larger, public companies, it 
was not a meaningful concept before the late nineteenth century.  Until then, almost 
all business transacting was essentially local in nature and generally thinly capitalized. 
This meant that companies were more susceptible to local law and regulation.  The 
early pattern of incorporation or “chartering” also limited the potential for corporate 
abuse.  At first corporations were created by special acts (concessions) of the state’s 
legislature.  Corporations routinely requested a charter from the state where they 
were principally located and doing business.  These charters were typically granted 
only where an enterprise’s commercial objectives coincided with the state’s larger 
public-regarding ones.18  These natural and legal limits constrained the growth of 
14. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
delivered to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007); 
Memorandum from Martin Lipton and Kevin S. Schwartz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, A United 
Nations Proposal Defining Corporate Social Responsibility for Human Rights, to clients (May 1, 
2008), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/f iles/wachtell_lipton_memo_on_
global_business_human_rights.pdf.
15. Press Release, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on 
Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. SG/A/934 
(July 29, 2005).
16. See Caroline Rees, Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy Sch., Access 
to Remedies for Corporate Human Rights Impacts: Improving Non-Judicial Mechanisms 
(2008).
17. For an overview of the ebb and f low of attention to the CSR field, see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles 
of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 Kan. L. Rev. 
77 (2002).
18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 390–400 (3d ed. 2005); James Willard 
Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780–
1970 (1970) (providing seminal discussions of early corporate legal history).
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power in the corporate form.  Leaving aside the railroads and large oil trusts, through 
this period corporations posed little threat to states’ ability to regulate in the public 
interest.
 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, industrialization had 
progressed substantially, and the states enacted general laws of incorporation that 
fostered the conduct of business in the corporate form.  The earliest incorporation 
laws limited the scope of legitimate corporate activity, corporations’ ability to raise 
capital, and corporations’ ability to hold stock in other corporations.19  But these 
limits were quickly abandoned once the states realized the revenue generating 
potential of collecting franchise fees from companies that incorporated in their state. 
Indeed, the lure of franchise fees motivated the states to allow incorporation even by 
businesses that were neither located in nor doing significant business within their 
state.  When New Jersey (the early front runner) proved indecisive about the direction 
of its corporate laws, Delaware took the lead.  As a small state it had much to gain 
from franchise fees, especially the larger ones payable by public companies. 
Furthermore, because Delaware had few public companies concentrated in the state, 
its lawmakers could craft corporate laws without pressure from powerful, potentially 
adverse in-state constituencies.  In this respect, the specialization of corporate 
law—the separation between corporate issues and ones relating to third parties’ 
interests—was an indelible feature of its early development.  The areas of concern 
identified with CSR were relegated to other areas of law.  With Delaware’s ascendancy, 
the political power base that pushed for loose, open-ended corporate laws (principally 
corporate managers) was divorced from politically enfranchised, in-state interests.20
 This historical development of what is deemed “corporate law” has proven to be 
sticky.  It remains true to this day, and it has had a substantial normative influence 
on the study of corporate law and CSR.  Atomization of different areas of law relevant 
to CSR (laws and regulations governing shareholder voice, labor organization, 
workers’ safety, environmental quality, creditors’ rights, and corporate political 
conduct) has forestalled the evolution of CSR teaching and scholarship within law 
schools.  Atomization and specialization within law have made it much harder to 
piece together the CSR puzzle.21 
 Returning to early corporate legal history: necessity sometimes pushed businesses 
where the law had not.  As large enterprises such as railroads struggled to expand 
rapidly, they became sensitive to the necessity of supporting their workforce’s basic 
needs.  To meet these needs, the railroads were early contributors to the development 
19. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study 
of Corporations, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 81 (1999) (documenting the early history of corporate form).
20. For discussion of Delaware’s stake in corporate law, see Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice 
of Forum and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 57 (2009).
21. For further discussion of this theme, that complexity obfuscates vital questions within corporate law, see 
Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 469 (2006); Faith Stevelman Kahn, 
Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power in Corporate Law, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 1107 (1997).  For further background, see Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law, 
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2007).
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of the YMCA.22  And Henry Ford’s efforts to “raise up” his workers’ quality of 
life—extraordinarily intrusive and paternalistic as they were—are well 
documented.23 
 After the stock market crash in 1929 and in the years of the Great Depression, 
large businesses were hardly in a position to address the needs of their workers, 
creditors, or local communities.  The rise of New Deal era legislation (and its ultimate 
acceptance by the federal courts) validated the federal government’s role in protecting 
workers’ and consumers’ safety.24  In the 1930s, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. 
Means’s seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property discussed the 
status of large businesses in the rapid modernization and industrialization of the 
United States.25  Their work openly asked whether the growing ranks of publicly 
held companies were properly conceived of as the private property of their owners or, 
rather, as socio-economic institutions capable of shaping their financial and political 
environment to their private advantage, and sometimes the public’s disadvantage. 
Berle and Means’s writing has had a seminal impact on the modern field of corporate 
law.  But academic corporate law has focused principally on the economic implications 
of separating ownership (equity investment) from control (boards and senior executive 
officers).  Far less attention has been paid to the authors’ expressed concern that 
massive capital accumulation in the corporate form might pose a threat to democratic 
social order in the United States.26 
 The 1950s has been described as the “era of managerialism.”27  In this period, 
economic growth and prosperity were sufficiently widespread and sustained to defer 
debate over businesses’ broader responsibilities to society.  But by the mid-1970s, 
22. See F. Emerson Andrews, Corporation Giving 23–26 (Russell Sage Foundation 1952) (1903) 
(providing an account of the relationship between the development of the railroads and the YMCA 
movement).  See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of 
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 579, 594–600 (1997) (discussing early corporate giving  laws 
from the perspective of corporate governance). 
23. For discussion of Ford’s “benevolent” intrusion into the personal lives of his employees, see Stuart 
Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism 1880–1940, at 88–89 (1976) (describing how Ford 
conditioned a $5 per day wage on his employees being made subject to intense home inspection for 
wholesomeness and adherence to middle class values); Douglas G. Brinkley, Wheels for the 
World: Henry Ford, His Company, and a Century of Progress (2003); Allan Nevins, Ford: 
The Times, The Man, The Company 553–54 (1954).
24. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: ERIE, the 
Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 
197–216 (2000).
25. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1933).
26. For example, this was evident from the tenor of most of the papers presented at a Columbia Conference 
celebrating the 75th Anniversary of Berle and Means’s Groundbreaking Book on Business Law.  See 
Press Release, Columbia Law School, CLS Hosts Conference Celebrating 75th Anniversary of Berle 
Book (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2007/
December07/ berle_75th (providing a description of the conference).
27. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1982 (1991) 
(describing 1950s as the “high tide of benevolent managerialism”).
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concern over corporate abuses once again erupted.  Against the background of the 
Vietnam War (and corporate support for the war), there were discoveries of widespread 
corporate bribery and other unlawful payments at home and abroad, early concerns 
about corporate water and air pollution, and a growing awareness of multinationals’ 
involvement (alongside the CIA) in the violence and political tumult in Latin 
America’s southern cone.  Debate over the power and responsibilities of public 
companies was reignited.28  
 It was in the 1970s that CSR was born as a discrete movement within corporate 
law.  Its greatest expression was shareholder “social” activism through the corporate 
proxy.29  As a matter of law, it was shaped, chiefly, by the SEC’s shareholder proposal 
rule, but the SEC did not welcome this creative form of shareholder-based social 
activism.  Nevertheless, given the Commission’s mandate to act not only to protect 
investors but also to act “in the public interest,”30 the SEC could not go too far in 
squelching shareholder activism without risking even more vocal backlash.  Dr. Leon 
Sullivan’s proxy activism connecting corporate leadership issues with equal rights 
issues was the most famous example in these early years.31  Such shareholder proxy 
activism spurred corporations to increase diversity and limit racial and gender bias in 
the workplace.  It also spurred social initiatives such as divestment from South Africa 
(where apartheid persisted).32  
 CSR has also pushed in favor of greater attention to institutional integrity and 
accountability.  The corporate bribery and illegal campaign contribution scandals 
mentioned above gave rise to Congress’s enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977.33  The Act not only prohibited such bribery,34 but also raised the 
standards for accuracy and reliability in corporate reporting through federal books 
28. For evidence within the corporate case law, see Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 
404 (Del. Ch. 1969) (describing social tensions pushing in the direction of a greater showing of 
corporations’ legitimacy).
29. See generally Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals As a Vehicle for 
Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 365 (2006) (addressing the 
“building blocks” of the allocation of power between shareholders and management); Donald E. 
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1971) 
(offering a general survey of the phenomenon).
30. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006).
31. See Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic Perspectives from the 
NGO Community, 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1265 (2004) (illustrating the continued inf luence of Dr. 
Sullivan’s proxy activism).
32. See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 
(1993) (discussing the development of the shareholder proposal rule); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder 
Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879 (1994) (describing the 
history of shareholder activism and setting forth the argument that the SEC’s gatekeeping role over 
shareholder proposals was ill conceived).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2006) (setting forth prohibited foreign trade practices by issuers 
and domestic concerns).
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and records and internal controls requirements.35  In 1987, this initiative was 
supplemented by the publication of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 
influential Treadway Report (“Treadway”), which f leshed out the nature of “good 
corporate governance” in terms of internal controls.36  These efforts have been 
combined with ongoing securities law reforms, which have raised the standards for 
accurate and timely corporate reporting, as expressed recently and most dramatically 
in Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.37  
 Social action shareholder proposals are still a significant phenomenon in the 
CSR area, though more traditional “shareholder value” related proposals have also 
become a constant.38  With respect to the latter, for example, shareholder proposals 
calling for the repeal of anti-takeover charter and bylaw provisions have become 
commonplace.39  Furthermore, there is overlap between “social action” and 
“shareholder value” proxy proposals, as is evident in recent proposals focusing on 
executive compensation.40
 C. CSR as a Social Movement and Business Strategy
 CSR appears to be gaining traction as a grassroots social movement; hence, 
corporations are increasingly sensitive to the need to manage consumer, investor, and 
popular concern about CSR issues.41  The growth of ethically motivated investing is 
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).
36. See Report of the Nat’l Comm’n on Fraudulent Fin. Reporting 31–48 (1987); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237 (1997).
37. See discussion infra Part V.B.
38. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2006) (involving a shareholder proposal regarding procedural aspects of placing shareholder nominated 
candidates on a coporate ballot); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange 
Act Release No. 56,914, 92 SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release 56,914] 
(the SEC’s most recent pronouncement on shareholder proposals).
39. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 
(2005).
40. See, e.g., “Say on Pay” Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation: The New Frontier of Corporate 
Governance Activism, M&A Commentary (Latham Watkins, New York, N.Y.) Nov. 2007, available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2039_1.pdf.
41. See Kellye Y. Testy, What Is the “New” Corporate Social Responsibility?: Linking Progressive Corporate Law 
with Progressive Social Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 (2002).  In a recent study, consumers favored 
support of community philanthropy but cared even more about employee benefits and human rights in 
manufacturing, which are core business issues as well as social issues.  See Press Release, Cone LLC, 
2004 Cone Corporate Citizenship Study Results: Multi-Year Study Finds 21% Increase in Americans 
Who Say Corporate Support of Social Issues Is Important in Building Trust (Dec. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.metronewyork.childrensmiraclenetwork.org/radio/radio.php?view=45.
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one example of this increased interest and concern.42  Increased consumer preference 
for recyclable products is another example.43 
 There are many strategies that businesses use to improve their appeal to socially 
conscious consumers and investors.44  The most traditional strategy is corporate 
donations to nonprofits—commonly known as corporate philanthropy or corporate 
charitable giving.45  Corporate philanthropy encompasses not only direct financial 
contributions, but also the gifting of products and employee time to nonprofits.  As 
is true with respect to all forms of corporate civic action, corporate philanthropy 
remains controversial.  Because there are foreseeable public relations benefits arising 
from such donations, some commentators view them as being fundamentally 
self-serving—in essence another form of corporate advertising.  Furthermore, 
corporate giving is still not subject to a comprehensive legal disclosure requirement, 
a fact that undermines the legitimacy of this form of corporate civic action.46 
Although the motivation for corporate giving will always remain murky, a mandatory 
SEC disclosure requirement would go far in promoting the legitimacy of corporate 
philanthropy programs.  Companies should also be pressed to go on record with the 
criteria that govern which gifts they make.  Companies that have well run 
philanthropy programs will likely continue to garner consumer benefits from them.
 A more recent CSR phenomenon is the adoption of Corporate Codes of (Ethical) 
Conduct (“Corporate Codes”).47  These Codes address many concerns associated 
with CSR, including commitments to accurate reporting; prohibitions on self-dealing 
and other unlawful payments; responsibility to workers, communities, and the 
42. See, e.g., Calvert Investments, http://www.calvertgroup.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (providing a 
prominent example of a mutual fund family devoted to creating wealth through socially responsible 
investing); Social Investment Forum, http://www.socialinvest.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) 
(maintaining a website functioning as a clearinghouse of information on the subject).
43. See, e.g., Nat’l Pollution Prevention Ctr., Pollution Prevention in Corporate Strategy 
(2005), available at http://www.umich.edu/~nppcpub/resources/compendia/CORPpdfs/CORPcaseA.
pdf (providing a case study assessing McDonald’s commitment to environmentally friendly operations).
44. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1, 8–23 (2005).
45. See Curt Weeden, Corporate Social Investing: The Breakthrough Strategy of Giving and 
Getting Corporate Contributions 1–11 (1998); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, 
Executives’ Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1147, 1153–54 (1997); Kahn, 
supra note 22.
46. There have been efforts to adopt such a rule.  In 1997, Rep. Paul Gillmor (R-Ohio) proposed two bills 
requiring corporate disclosure and shareholder participation in charitable giving.  See H.R. 944, 105th 
Cong. (1997); H.R. 945, 105th Cong. (1997).  Rep. Gillmor introduced a similar bill in 2002 targeting 
donations to organizations affiliated with corporate officers and directors.  See H.R. 3745, 107th Cong. 
(2002).  An initial draft of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the House included a disclosure requirement for 
a corporation’s charitable gifts and its board members’ charitable organization affiliations, H.R. 3763, 
107th Cong. § 7(a)(2) (as passed by House, Apr. 24, 2002), but the adopted legislation failed to do so. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 & 
18 U.S.C.).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
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environment; and the supervision of supply chains.48  There was a vast movement in 
favor of public companies’ adoption of the Corporate Codes in the late 1990s.  The 
popular phenomenon was given further force by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
which promised lighter penalties if corporate transgressors demonstrated they had 
established a bona fide institutional framework for promoting legal compliance.49 
Corporate law firms also pushed the adoption of Corporate Codes, as lawyers 
increasingly recognized that helping corporations respond to CSR concerns presented 
valuable new practice opportunities.50  
 As is true of corporate philanthropy programs, Corporate Codes of conduct have 
proven controversial.  It has been difficult to distinguish the lip service paid to ethical 
corporate conduct from more genuine, deeply embedded institutional commitments. 
But it is clear that consumers’ and investors’ expectations of ethical business conduct 
are rising.  And it is also clear that these rising expectations are fueling even greater 
corporate and academic interest in the subject of CSR.  Over time, this increased 
attention and analysis should add clarity to what is surface and what goes deeper in 
CSR programs.51
 Another sign of the growing public, investor, and consumer interest in CSR is 
evident in the phenomenon of public companies’ increasingly publishing “social 
responsibility reports.”  These are typically distributed as part of companies’ annual 
communications to shareholders, but it is obvious that they are written with a broader 
audience in mind.52  Once again, there is concern that these reports may be superficial 
48. See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical 
Conduct, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 253 (2005).
49. Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate Criminal Liability, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 275, 297 (2008).
50. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, 
Other Ills, 29 J. Corp. L. 267, 285, 311 (2004) (discussing law firms’ stake in helping implement formal 
systems to address various risks to the corporation, including reputation and political risk).  The 
American Bar Association recently created a Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility.  The 
Committee’s mission statement is illuminating: 
  The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Committee is a national leader for attorneys 
working in this rapidly growing practice area.  The rise of transnational business has 
created new challenges for corporations and their counsel.  Companies in nearly every 
industry—from technology, to apparel, to mining and extractive industries—have come 
under scrutiny from governments, human rights groups, and their shareholders as they 
navigate the challenges of investing and operating in foreign nations, with vastly different 
standards of human rights, environmental protections, and corruption standards that are 
expected of them at home.  Companies face lawsuits in the U.S. courts for alleged violations 
of the Alien Tort Statute and a host of other laws for their conduct abroad. At home, 
corporations seek guidance in seeking to remain profitable industry leaders, while fulfilling 
their obligations as good corporate citizens.
 American Bar Association Section of International Law: Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, 
http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=IC634100 (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
51. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 
31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 675, 680 (2006).
52. Even a cursory Internet search turns up a virtual treasure trove of CSR reports by public companies. 
Most companies post these reports on their corporate web pages.  See, e.g., Target, Corporate 
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public relations campaigns; even worse, they could be intended to smooth over legal 
compliance problems or companies’ exploitation of market externalities. 
 On the bright side, however, even if companies adopt CSR statements and 
Corporate Codes for merely defensive or public relations purposes, once progressive 
social objectives are codified as part of the corporation’s mission statement, they are 
likely to be absorbed more deeply into the company’s culture.53  After publishing 
CSR reports or adopting CSR related Corporate Codes or mission statements, 
companies have more to lose in terms of consumer and investor good will if they are 
exposed as being hypocritical.  Employee morale suffers if there is a disconnect 
between the company’s stated goals and its actual operations.  Such loss of morale 
can be costly for organizations.  Enhanced political risk is also a factor.  If notable 
failures are exposed after a company has launched a high profile CSR campaign, 
politicians may be more motivated to push for mandatory rules and restrictions.  Such 
legal rules are likely to be more costly for companies than self-regulation would have 
been.  In these respects, Corporate Codes and CSR publicity campaigns may gain 
more institutional traction than cynics might believe. 
 The power of the Internet is also driving CSR’s increasing inf luence.  The 
Internet provides a low cost, highly effective tool for galvanizing consumers’ and 
investors’ opinions and helping them to take collective action.  The Internet is also 
forcing more information relevant to CSR out into public view.  In the age of cell 
phone cameras, YouTube, and blogging, it is much harder for companies to cover up 
accidents and abuses.54  The better run ones situate themselves to be proactive rather 
than reactive.  The power of the Internet has also reduced corporate senior officers’ 
ability to hide behind a veil of ignorance.  Plausible deniability is less plausible in a 
world where information f lows so freely.  Accordingly, improved information 
technology is promoting more rigorous fiduciary standards of oversight and good 
faith in relation to corporate boards and senior executive officers.55
 The dynamics of group behavior may also work in favor of CSR.  Business 
conduct of this kind appears to be highly mimetic (“isomorphic”).  Companies often 
conform their formal guidelines and Corporate Codes of best practices (and efforts 
Responsibility Report (2008), available at http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.
jsp?contentId=WCMP04-031084.
53. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility 
Rhetoric, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 786 (2007).
54. See generally Michele Micheletti & Dietlind Stolle, Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for Global 
Social Justice, 611 Annals 157 (discussing how various activist organizations, including “Internet spin 
doctors,” have reached consumers and forced socially irresponsible companies (citing specifically 
sweatshop targets such as Nike) to alter their conduct).
55. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (defining the duty of good faith as a component of 
the duty of loyalty specifically in the context of a derivative complaint); Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., 
No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *48 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008) (discussing duty of care in 
the context of approving a merger); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (articulating the standards by which director liability and oversight are measured).  For an 
excellent analysis of the recent good faith cases, see Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 
32 Del. J. Corp. L. 719 (2007).
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to adhere to them) to those of their peers or leaders in the industry.  Public companies 
seem remarkably responsive to the pressure of emerging norms and industry best 
practices.  This is visible in regard to the adoption of Corporate Codes of ethical 
conduct, commitments to sustainability, the observance of labor and employment 
standards, and the monitoring of supply chains.56  Even though CSR may only 
recently have achieved critical mass, this does not mean that the changes it is 
producing will not have staying power.57  As was true in regard to racial and gender 
discrimination in the workplace, practices that were once part of the status quo have 
become fundamentally unacceptable, through a process of gradual social and 
institutional evolution.  A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that investors’, 
consumers’, and workers’ commitments to CSR are more than mere lip service.58 
The election of Barack Obama as America’s forty-fourth president may signal a 
tipping point in favor of more social solidarity, and successful corporations will 
realize the benefits of promoting this positivity.59
 D. CSR and the Regulatory State 
 In American law, the work of CSR happens in separate, specialized areas of law, 
especially in federal regulation.  These include regulations governing the workforce 
(including health and safety requirements and pension and health care requirements), 
environmental regulations, consumer safety regulations, specialized food and drug 
safety regulations, regulations protecting investors from fraud, and regulations 
requiring accountability regarding corporate lobbying and other corporate political 
activity. 
 The scope of federal (and state) regulations has expanded dramatically over the 
past fifty years.  Nevertheless, there is widespread concern that the regulations are 
not operating to yield greater corporate responsibility and improved social welfare. 
The reasons for this gap are too complex to be addressed herein.  But it is obvious 
that politicians and legislatures have a strong incentive to make promises and even 
pass laws that promise broad social welfare reforms, but at the same time have an 
56. See generally Stuart Cooper, Corporate Social Performance: A Stakeholder Approach, Corporate Social 
Responsibility Series (David Crowther ed., 2004) (discussing what inf luences societal pressures have 
on corporate governance). 
57. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human 
Rights?, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 75 (2005). 
58. For scholarship demonstrating concern for CSR issues, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate 
Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (2001); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and 
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroad, 62 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 9 (1999); Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1431 (2002); Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational Codes of 
Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field for Developing-Country Workers, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 
611 (2001); Fairfax, supra note 53; O’Connor-Felman, supra note 10.
59. Time and again in his inauguration address, the forty-fourth president called for a new embrace of 
responsibility in every sector of American society.  Inaugural Address, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 
DCPD200900001 (Jan. 20, 2009).
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incentive to please corporate industry by giving the nod to implementing regulations 
that are toothless. 
 In this vein, Americans have become increasingly worried about the content and 
safety of a broad range of products manufactured by multinational corporations. 
Laxity, carelessness, and underfunding appear to be significant problems at the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission.60  The Food and Drug Administration has 
also come under recent fire for inadequately policing the safety of medicines sold by 
American pharmaceutical corporations.61  The quality of OSHA’s oversight of 
workplace safety has been subject to increased criticism.62  And despite some increased 
rigor on the EPA’s part, industry has succeeded in resisting heightened emissions 
controls and more rigorous air pollution limits which would effectively reduce toxic 
smog.63  And the SEC appears to have been shockingly slow in responding to signs 
of massive investor fraud, as exemplified by the recent multi-billion dollar Madoff 
fraud (an estimated $50 billion loss)64 and Stanford fraud (an estimated $8 billion 
loss).65  In early February 2009, the head of the SEC’s enforcement division resigned 
under heavy criticism.66  In fact, the SEC’s regulatory and oversight failures seem 
alarmingly widespread.  The Commission itself conceded that its lax oversight 
contributed to the recent, grave financial turmoil of 2008–2009.67  This laxity is 
evident in the SEC’s waiver of net capital requirements (which had limited the 
leverage banks could assume),68 its failure to regulate better credit rating agencies 
(whose failed ratings contributed to the recent securitization debacle),69 and shortfalls 
60. See Eric Lipton, Safety Agency Faces Scrutiny Amid Changes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2007, § 1, at 1.  In 
2007, Mattel had to recall more than one million toys that had been made in China because they were 
covered in lead paint.  David Barboza, Why Lead in Toy Paint? It’s Cheaper, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2007, 
at C1.
61. Gardiner Harris, Study Condemns F.D.A.’s Handling of Drug Safety, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2006, at A1.
62. See Stephen Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety Largely in Hands of Industry, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 
2007, at A1.
63. See Associated Press, E.P.A. Urges Tougher Rules on Smog, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2007, at A14. 
64. Alex Berenson & Diana Henriques, S.E.C. Issues Mea Culpa on Madoff, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2008, at 
B1.
65. On February 17, 2009, the SEC filed civil charges against R. Allen Stanford and three of his companies 
in a federal district court in Dallas.  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen 
Stanford, Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm.  The SEC itself has gone on record 
with the observation that Stanford’s bank promised improbable, if not impossible returns to investors, 
which certainly raises questions about why the SEC did not act sooner.  Complaint at 2, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Standford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 09-CV-00289N (N. Dist. Tex. Feb. 16, 2009).  
66. See Gretchen Morgenson, Top Enforcer at the S.E.C. Steps Down, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2009, at B1. 
67. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
68. See id.
69. See Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2008, at 
A1. 
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in disclosure requirements, which allowed financial risk-taking and corporate 
leverage to spiral out of control.70  
 Surveying the landscape, it would appear that there are fundamental shortcomings 
in the system of regulatory oversight in the United States, and that corporations have 
been able to take advantage of these shortfalls in regulation.  Perhaps industry has 
grown too powerful in influencing regulation and minimizing enforcement.  Perhaps 
administrative agencies have been inadequately funded, poorly organized, or 
complacent.  The important point here is that critics of CSR cannot, in good faith, 
counter that a corporation’s job is merely to conform to the existing regulations, 
because it is apparent that regulations and regulators cannot keep up with corporations 
determined to outrun them.
 Compared to public companies, government regulators will always be understaffed 
and underfunded.  Furthermore, companies spend substantial sums to shape the 
regulations that will govern them (and their corporate speech is protected by the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  Despite the apparent expansion of 
federal regulation in the past half century, corporations have carved out room to 
maneuver under the rubric of “self regulation.” But this system of industry self 
regulation has too often failed.  There has been too little corporate transparency and 
too much arrogance.  (The role of unregulated financial derivatives in the current 
financial crisis provides an example of this.)  Corporate irresponsibility has been 
fostered by agency under-enforcement.  The present economic turmoil in the financial 
markets, which has triggered a broader and profound economic downturn, reflects 
the public’s loss of confidence in corporate America and Wall Street at many levels. 
The f light from CSR and responsible regulatory oversight has cost America dearly at 
the bottom line, and harmed its reputation in the world.
 E. Globalization, CSR, and Contemporary Political Philosophy
 As Michael Sandel has observed, although Americans are disinclined to discuss 
political philosophy, this does not mean we do not have one.71  Indeed, America’s 
embrace of pro-market ideology has played an enormous role in political and economic 
affairs domestically and internationally over the past thirty years.72  This is evident 
in the triumph of “Reaganomics” in the United States, and our exporting of the 
Washington consensus in favor of free market ideology around the globe.  This 
ideology has been unfavorable to CSR.  Even the Supreme Court has often looked 
unfavorably upon plaintiffs’ allegations of corporate trespasses against the 
70. See Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2009, § MM (Magazine), at 24.  The true 
intricacies of quantitative metrics of risk were not made clear to investors; they may not even have been 
clear to the financial institutions and investment bankers who relied upon them.  Id. 
71. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judical Review (1980).
72. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal 
Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1823, 1888–917 (2008) (discussing “market fundamentalism” 
and ideological “panmarketry,” along with the impact of globalization, as they relate to the development 
of the civil justice system in the United States).
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environment, workers’ and consumer’s rights, and investors’ complaints of fraud and 
unfairness.73  Shareholder primacy has been the guiding light in contemporary 
corporate law; deregulation has been the mantra in securities law.74  Throughout 
these decades, the economy has grown rapidly enough to provide cover for growing 
inequality and stagnating wages in the United States.  While there have been 
downturns in the financial markets and the broader economy, until the most recent 
one, they had been relatively brief and mild. In f lush times, business regulation has 
been tarred as unnecessary.75  In hard times, it has been resisted as too costly or 
dangerous to growth.  The increasing interest in CSR evident among consumers and 
investors may reflect the growing perception that laws and regulations cannot get the 
job done without more widespread popular support. 
 The mobilization of politically conservative think tanks, policy programs, and 
academic centers within law schools had fostered this right-leaning momentum that 
has prevailed for over twenty-five years.76  The Olin Foundation has had an enormous 
influence in moving the private law side of legal education in a conservative direction. 
The United States Chamber of Commerce has influenced the composition of the 
federal judiciary and even the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.77 
 In contrast, within academia, social scientists (sociologists, political scientists, 
historians, etc.) whose research would be relevant to CSR issues have remained 
largely cut off from one another and from academics at professional schools.  They 
speak a different language not only from economists,78 but also from corporate law 
73. In this period, for example, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has moved staunchly in the direction of 
favoring big business.  For discussion of the Court’s business-related jurisprudence in this period and 
also the role of the United States Chamber of Commerce in mobilizing public and judicial opinion, see 
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 38.
74. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 Iowa J. 
Corp. L. 637 (2006).
75. The tarring of Sarbanes-Oxley significantly ref lects the post-2002 stock market recovery.  For 
commentary on the backlash against Sarbanes-Oxley, see Faith Stevelman, Foreword, Corporate 
Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change?, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 475, 480 
(2008).
76. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (2007) (providing an extraordinarily well-researched, if 
partisan, critique of the inf luence of the Chicago School on late twentieth century American political 
economy and international relations); Michael Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal 
Movement (2008) (providing a general account of this trend); Robert C. Ellickson, Symposium on Post-
Chicago Law and Economics: Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors, 65  Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 23 (1989) (providing an early critique of the so-called “Law and Economics” school of thought); 
George W. Hicks, Jr., The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law School 
Student Body, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 623 (2006); Douglass T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for 
Free: How Private Judicial Seminars Are Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s 
Trust, 25 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 405 (2001) (offering an example of the conservative movement’s 
mobilization to inf luence the judiciary).
77. See Rosen, supra note 73.
78. For a lucid account of the contemporary concerns of economists that notes the opacity of the field, see 
Diane Coyle, The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters 
(2007).
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and business professors.  This is an almost unbelievably strange occurrence. 
Presumably it has been driven by the ever increasing technical specialization of 
academic research in each of these fields, and the highly competitive nature of 
academic progress.  Almost all scholars prefer to stay in the established channels, 
where they know the waters and can navigate without risk.  In this respect, the 
tenure system may not be functioning optimally.  It protects academics from being 
dismissed on account of their views, but it may not be stimulating appropriate cross-
disciplinary analysis.  Hence, it is likely that the atomization spurred by technical 
specialization, along with academics’ fear of intellectual embarrassment, has 
dramatically hindered CSR’s development as a field of study.  Even in an area like 
business and human rights, for example, there has been too little collaboration 
between academics and nonprofit leaders in international relations, corporate law, 
economics, and sociology.  For example, nonprofit leaders have worked tirelessly to 
promote transparency regarding multinationals’ payments to foreign governments for 
natural resource rights; they can point to the global Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative as evidence of their ongoing success.  But their efforts have gone mostly 
unnoticed by the corporate law professoriate, which has remained aloof.79 
 Leaving aside ideology, the limits of sovereignty and unrestrained international 
capital f lows pose a fundamental challenge to meaningful business regulation in 
areas relevant to CSR.80  It has become clear that corporations can reorganize to 
exploit the cost advantages of doing business in countries with little or no regulation 
of workers’ rights, environmental standards, or enforceable limits on bribery and 
corruption.81  In many instances, domestic laws and restrictions do not reach business 
conducted abroad.  Foreign companies accessing the American capital markets, or 
even foreign subsidiaries of U.S. reporting companies, may be able to organize 
themselves to avoid SEC disclosure requirements.  Only international cooperation 
on a vast scale can limit multinational enterprises’ ability to trespass on human rights, 
environmental integrity, and rule of law values.  We are only beginning to see the 
development of international institutions capable of taking on these challenges.
IV. THE CORPORATIONS COURSE
 A. The Traditional Course
 How does the content of the traditional Corporations course relate to CSR 
issues?82  Most professors begin by discussing the mechanics of corporate formation 
79. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: EITI Summary, http://eitransparency.org/eiti/summary 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2009); see also testimony infra Appendix A. 
80. For an important contribution to the emerging literature on corporate governance and regulatory 
arbitrage, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of 
Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 1710 (2008).
81. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16 
Transnat’l Law. 121 (2002).
82. My conclusions are based on a survey of the available casebooks and my conversations with colleagues at 
many other law schools. 
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and the essential legal attributes of the corporate form of business organization.83  As 
for legal attributes, this means centralized decision making in the board.  (Typically, 
boards delegate ordinary business authority to the senior executive officers.) 
Shareholders, and only shareholders, vote in director elections, on bylaw amendments, 
and exceptional transactions such as mergers, but on little else.  The corporation 
enjoys separate legal personhood, which encompasses a presumption that shareholders 
will be held harmless for unpaid corporate debts.  (This is the concept of the “limited 
liability” of corporate shareholders.)  Shareholders make a permanent commitment of 
equity capital in exchange for their shares, but this illiquidity is offset by their right 
to sell or otherwise transfer their shares.  The right to receive profits while the 
business is ongoing (i.e., dividends) lies solely in the board’s discretion.  In a nutshell, 
these are the basic legal attributes of the corporate form.  Variations are generally 
permitted, but at least in larger or public companies they are the exception. 
 Next, the judicially crafted fiduciary duties applicable to directors, officers, and 
controlling shareholders must be added to the picture.  With these, the essential 
features of the corporate law universe come into view.  Yet once fiduciary duties are 
added to the mix, even these clear principles yield to greater complexity.  The three 
basic fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith run to the corporation and the 
shareholders only.  In the name of promoting director accountability, the courts have 
declined to expand these fiduciary duties to bondholders, creditors, or employees. 
The force of fiduciary obligation, furthermore, is offset by a compelling respect for 
board autonomy in corporate law.  Ref lecting the preeminent authority afforded 
boards in the states’ corporate statutes, the courts have established a so-called 
“business judgment rule” (“BJR”).  The BJR operates, in effect, as a rule of judicial 
abstention.  So long as a company’s directors have acted in a passably informed 
manner, in good faith, and in the absence of having an immediate self-interest in the 
outcome of their decision, the BJR protects them from being second-guessed by 
shareholders or the courts. 
 Hence, the American framework of corporate governance is fundamentally about 
the allocation of rights and decision-making authority among a corporation’s board, 
officers, and shareholders.  Consistent with this focus, in the mainstream account, 
corporate law is about reducing the agency costs arising from the separation of 
ownership (equity holders) and control (directors and senior officers).84  In colloquial 
terms, this means that corporate laws are intended to encourage entrepreneurial, 
wealth-enhancing risk taking, while discouraging directors and officers from 
83. In a significant number of law schools, the basic Corporations course has been supplanted by a Business 
Associations course, which covers partnerships and other business entities as well as corporations. 
These courses generally include more discussion of agency law.  Once they commence discussion of the 
corporate form of business organization, their course work is as described herein.  However, there is 
some variation in the number of credits allocated to the introductory Corporations or Business 
Associations course, and this affects the scope of coverage of the course.
84. In this regard, corporate law has developed not only from the roots established by Berle and Means, see 
supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text, but also from economics-oriented scholarship.  See Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).  
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engaging in secret profit taking.  This pattern of corporate law is deemed maximally 
efficient—a concept at once breathtakingly powerful and elusive (as described further 
below).  
 Beyond shareholders’ limited voting rights, their powers are mostly restricted 
either to selling their shares or suing to enforce fiduciary duties and their basic voting 
rights.  Of course, shareholders will take a hit in selling their shares once bad news 
or underperformance is widely disclosed (which limits the efficacy of selling as a 
remedy for mismanagement).  Furthermore, corporate law imposes substantial 
constraints on shareholder litigation.  Shareholders are often deterred from proceeding 
not only by virtue of the BJR, but also by the “demand requirement.”  The latter 
requires plaintiff shareholders to ask the board itself to proceed against the defendant 
directors or officers, before proceeding with their claim.85 
 It is clear that the most influential corporate legal standards are the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.  But it is also obvious that the content and 
practical import of these duties is f luid, even opaque at times.  First, the duty of care 
operates at two distinct dimensions.  It has a transactional strain which mandates 
that directors inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them prior 
to approving a corporate act or transaction.86  Second, due care imports a duty of 
oversight that requires the board to implement a reasonably efficacious system of 
internal controls sufficient to yield reliable corporate reporting and assess the 
company’s success in complying with the law.87  That said, as an enforceable legal 
standard, as opposed to an essentially hortatory, normative one, the duty of care is 
essentially moribund.88  Charter exculpation provisions, corporate indemnification, 
and corporate-funded directors’ and officers’ insurance have generally limited, or 
eliminated, the potential for holding these managers personally liable in suits alleging 
breach of due care.89 
 In recent years, some of the most interesting jurisprudential developments have 
been in the area of good faith.  This duty has been reinvigorated and somewhat 
expanded, especially in contrast to the duty of care.  Bad faith acts by directors or 
officers fall outside charter exculpation provisions, and perhaps also corporate 
indemnification and insurance.  Hence, the stakes for corporate defendants are much 
higher than with shareholder due care claims.  Nevertheless, despite the recent 
85. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (holding that “demand can only be excused where 
facts are alleged with particularity which creates a reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was 
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule”); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 
784 (Del. 1981) (finding that a stockholder may retain the right to sue in his derivative action, without 
prior demand on the board of directors, only if (s)he can prove that a demand would have been futile).
86. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
87. This duty was first given modern expression in 1996 by the Delaware Chancery Court.  See In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d 959. 
88. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate 
Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 464–67 (1993).
89. See E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a 
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. Law. 399 (1987).
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judicial attention to the duty of good faith, the chance of directors or officers actually 
being held liable in damages for breach of good faith remains remote.90  Good faith 
has become significant as a framework for evaluating directors’ conduct in approving 
conflicted transactions (for example, executive compensation awards), as well as their 
vigor in responding to signs of corporate illegality.91  Nevertheless, state corporate 
law has lagged behind federal law in requiring boards to be vigilant regarding the 
accuracy of their companies’ public reports.92  
 The fiduciary duty of loyalty is a more trenchant force in corporate law.  Most 
fundamentally, it prohibits directors, officers, and controlling shareholders from 
engaging in self-dealing transactions that injure the corporation and/or the 
shareholders.93  Nevertheless, although fiduciary loyalty is the core of corporate law, 
its prohibition on self-dealing is also often unenforceable.  If a conflicted transaction 
has been ratified by a disinterested majority of shares, or not-too-directly-self-
interested directors,94 the transaction will be largely immune from judicial review.95  
 A limit on breach of loyalty exculpation via independent ratification exists in 
relation to controlling shareholders’ transactions with minority shareholders—for 
example, freezeout transactions where the controller acquires the minorities’ shares 
for cash.  At least in Delaware, these transactions—even seemingly independent 
director ratification—only effectuates a shift in the burden of proof.  The Delaware 
90. For a thoughtful recent proposal advocating reversing allowing full exculpation of duty of care liability 
for corporate directors, see Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Stockholder Litigation Under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law: Director Inattention and Director Protection Under Delaware General Corporate Law 
Section 102(b)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 695 (2008).
91. This trend was initiated by the seminal case In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, and followed in numerous 
cases.  See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); Stone, 
911 A.2d 362 (affirming Caremark as the law of Delaware and elaborating on the link between the duty 
of care and the duty of good faith).
92. From the late 1970s onward, various SEC enforcement actions affirmed directors’ and officers’ roles in 
crafting and supervising firms’ public disclosures.  See, e.g., Report of Investigation In re Stirling Homex 
Corp. Relating to Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, Exchange Act 
Release No. 11516 (July 2, 1975); In re the Cooper Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 
SEC Docket 298 (July 2, 1975); Report of Investigation In re the Cooper Companies, Inc. As it Relates 
to the Conduct of Cooper’s Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 35,082, 58 SEC Docket 591 
(Dec. 12, 1994); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 65 SEC Docket 1240 (Sept. 30, 1997).  For an insightful review of 
the accounting and auditing literature elaborating corporate internal control structures and their 
incorporation into corporate law standards, see Eisenberg, supra note 88.
93. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (providing an evolving interpretation of the duty of 
loyalty in the context of the stock options backdating scandals).
94. For discussion of the rise of independent directors in corporate law that seeks to provide a justification 
for their role independent of their accountability to shareholders, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
Stan. L. Rev. 1465 (2007).
95. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 775 (1998) (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997); see also J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 
95 Ky. L.J. 53 (2006) (critiquing the law’s movement in this direction).
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courts have steadfastly applied the rigorous “entire fairness” standard of review to 
freezeouts and other self-dealing transactions by controllers—instead of the 
deferential BJR standard of review.  But once again, even this seemingly hard and 
fast principle is not unyielding.  The Delaware Chancery Court is attempting to 
distinguish the Delaware Supreme Court’s established framework for freezeouts and 
is advocating allowing deferential review where a freezeout has been ratified by 
disinterested directors or a majority of the (disinterested) minority shareholders.96  In 
this shift one can see corporate law’s own infatuation with self-regulation, as was 
discussed earlier in regard to federal regulation.97 
 Most introductory courses include some discussion of the basic rules and standards 
applied to mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions.  Notwithstanding a 
panoply of relevant federal securities laws and regulations, corporate fiduciary 
standards—i.e., variations on the same duties of care, loyalty, and good faith—are 
often the most trenchant ones in these transactions.  These fiduciary standards often 
have dispositive importance in affecting the outcomes of these transactions, especially 
where the relief sought is additional disclosure or an injunction stopping the deal’s 
progress (as is often the case).98  In this respect Delaware’s rich M&A case law 
provides deal planners and principals a detailed “transactional choreography”: a trove 
of best practices relevant to the conduct of boards, officers, controlling shareholders, 
investment bankers, and corporate general counsel.99 
 B. Going One Step Further to Discuss CSR Concerns
  1. CSR, Director Primacy, and the Limits of Shareholder Voting 
 Shareholder voting provides one framework for considering the pervasive 
ambiguity in corporate law.  First there is the curiosity of who does and does not 
have a right to vote in corporate law.  As stated earlier, it is only shareholders who 
have voting rights in the election of directors.  When it comes to fundamental 
transactions, the states’ statutes vary on whether holders of preferred stock have 
distinct class voting rights.  Delaware is sufficiently “deal loving” that its corporate 
code does not provide for a separate class voting right for holders of preferred stock, 
96. For a review of the entire fairness standard and an argument against applying the BJR to going private 
transactions (except where there has been a genuine market check or auction of the company as a going 
concern), see Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 Bus. Law. 
775 (2007).
97. The SEC’s “pulling” the net capital rule for the five largest investment banks provides a recent glaring 
example.  See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 3, 2008, at A23.  The FASB’s allowing Enron to determine its own valuations for many of its most 
important contracts was another experiment gone awry.  See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, 
Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1579, 1589 
n.28 (2002).
98. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-
Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133 (2004) (providing a discussion of the high proportion of 
investor class actions in M&A transactions, as a proportion of the Court of Chancery’s docket).  
99. For elaboration of the concept of “transactional choreography,” see Stevelman, supra note 96. 
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even when the transaction could disadvantage the preferred holders financially.100 
Debenture holders possessing rights to convert to equity are held to have no voting 
rights prior to conversion.101  Even though bondholders commonly provide long term 
capital to the enterprise, corporate law affords them neither voting rights nor fiduciary 
duties.  They are relegated to protecting themselves, where possible, through their 
indenture contracts.  Corporate law also contemplates no voting rights for employees, 
even where layoffs are a probable outcome of a merger or sale of substantially all 
assets—notwithstanding that employees make firm-specific investments of human 
capital. 
 The narrow scope of these voting rights is not easy to explain.  Perhaps it reflects 
the outdated notion that (only) holders of common stock are the owners of the 
firm—a concept that was problematic by the time of Berle and Means’s The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.102  Perhaps the narrow scope of voting in corporate 
law reflects the equally contestable notion that as the residual claimants, shareholders’ 
interests operate as a surrogate for all stakeholders’ best interests—corporate law’s 
version of trickle down economics.  Perhaps it reflects the successful domination of 
labor by capital, consistent with the basic pattern of capitalism.  And Delaware’s 
failure to afford class voting rights to holders of preferred stock, even in recapitalization 
mergers that might compromise the preferred shareholders’ interests, ref lects 
Delaware corporate law’s zeal for corporate transactions.103 
 Even if one accepts the restrictions in the scope of voting rights described above, 
there are basic problems even in the matter of common shareholders’ voting for directors. 
State corporate law stops short of supporting a system that would fully enfranchise 
shareholders.  This is evident in the fact that shareholders have no right to have a say 
in who will be nominated for election to the board.  The task of nominating the next 
slate of directors is delegated to the sitting board.  If the shareholders wish to 
nominate a separate slate then, consistent with the SEC’s proxy rules, they must bear 
the considerable expense and risk of mounting a separate proxy solicitation, 
distributing it to their cohorts, and filing it with the SEC.104  Second, state corporate 
law provides little room for insurgent shareholders to be reimbursed for their efforts 
in mounting a separate slate in a director election (whereas the sitting board’s slate, 
which will be voted on via the corporate proxy, is funded by the corporation).105 
100. See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005) (discussing 
the absence of a class voting requirement in recapitalization mergers in Delaware and providing a 
discussion of California’s alternative scheme).
101. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302 (Del. 1988).
102. Berle & Means, supra note 25.
103. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005).  The court 
expressed its zeal in supporting corporate transactions by presuming that freezeout transactions 
contribute to economic efficiency and the creation of wealth, without adequately taking into account the 
potential unfairness to minority shareholders.  See id.
104. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access 
and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 475, 479 (2008). 
105. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173 (1955).
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Hence, outside of contests for control in takeovers, the (non)reimbursement rule 
enshrined in corporate law strongly inhibits real director elections.106  The net result 
is that although it is axiomatic in corporate law that boards are elected by shareholders, 
it is more realistic to think of the incumbents as selecting their successors.107 
 In this regard, corporate law has radically reinforced the status quo of clubby, 
demographically homogeneous boards—a reality which has contributed to the 
detrimental impact of “group think.”  This is more troublesome still because modern 
corporate law is praised as enabling shareholder choice.  Clearly this enabling of 
shareholder choice does not encompass enabling shareholders to have a meaningful 
role in nominating directors for election, hence voting for directors of their own 
choosing. 
 From the above discussion it might seem that enhancing the shareholder franchise 
would produce better, more accountable, less despotic corporate enterprises.  Yet, for 
proponents of director primacy, a more robust shareholder franchise would limit the 
board’s compass to run the company in the interest of the broader range of corporate 
constituencies: shareholders and non-shareholders.  These commentators criticize 
reforms that would give more control to shareholders in director elections.  They see 
such reforms as threatening the corporation’s best interests and capacity to produce 
maximum returns beneficial to all.108  The competing claims of “shareholder primacy” 
and “director primacy” go back to the early beginnings of corporate law.  For example, 
they are evident in a series of essays exchanged between Adolph Berle and E. Merrick 
Dodd in the 1930s.109  At times the proponents of shareholder primacy recast their 
claims as being stakeholder neutral, on the rationale that shareholders (as residual 
claimants) cannot be enriched before third-party claims have been satisfied.110  The 
106. See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 462 F.3d 121 (describing the SEC’s 
recommended changes to the shareholder nomination process in relation to the use of the corporate 
proxy statement); Exchange Act Release 56,914, supra note 38.
107. See generally Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that a board of 
directors may not take unilateral action to impede shareholder voting without a compelling justification 
for such action).
108. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 547 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999).
109. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers Held in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931) (arguing 
that corporations exist to increase shareholder wealth), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (arguing that the corporation 
owes responsibilities to all corporate constituents and to society as a whole).
110. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 124, 125 n.2 (1994) (“This illustrates the point that the maximization of social welfare 
is not necessarily inconsistent with using the shareholder wealth maximization criterion as the lodestar 
for corporate governance.  Indeed, the ultimate defense of the shareholder wealth criterion must be cast 
in social welfare terms: that the sum of payouts by the firm—wages, supplier payments, dividends, 
interest, and taxes—will be maximized by a system that assigns the residual claim to shareholders and 
empowers them to select managers who will act responsively.  This is not an uncomplicated point, 
however, since good management of a declining firm may decide, for example, that plant closings and 
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opposing camp sees shareholder primacy as unfairly and arbitrarily privileging the 
providers of equity capital.  
 As a matter of positive law, the present model of corporate governance validates 
board primacy—it gives boards enough re-electability and discretion in the exercise 
of their office to make decisions that balance the interests of shareholders with those 
of extra-shareholder constituencies.  In the dialectic of one-dimensional shareholder 
interests and unaccountable boards, director primacy has the better claims; 
nevertheless, in its naked form the dialectic is a tired one.  Real progress in corporate 
governance will come when corporate leaders and their counsel embrace a new 
paradigm of economics in which scarcity takes into account human beings’ brief time 
on the planet, the claims of later generations, and the problem of nonrenewable 
resources. In this regard, the burgeoning literature on sustainability offers new 
promise to corporate governance and professors seeking new paths in teaching it.
  2. The Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders
 Another area of the Corporations course that can serve as a platform for discussing 
the CSR issue is the limited liability of corporate shareholders.  A central tenet of 
corporate law is that only the firm itself is responsible for its obligations.  This is true 
not only with respect to a company’s contractual obligations, but also for tort damages. 
The fact that tort victims—such as the employees and local citizens in Libby, 
Montana, devastated by Grace’s wanton mishandling of asbestos—can be left 
uncompensated through the corporate bankruptcy process is a remarkably socially 
salient feature of contemporary corporate law.111 
 The limited liability of corporate shareholders is valorized as a major driver of 
wealth creation.  Judges Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that in public companies 
limited liability is essential to the uniform pricing of corporate shares, which 
facilitates trading and hence efficient investor diversification.112  Nevertheless, a 
scheme of proportionate liability could be adopted that would be compatible with 
uniform pricing, broad liquidity, and the creation of wealth by public companies.  In 
addition, the “market trading” rationale is irrelevant to shareholders in closely held 
firms, even though limited liability is still the rule in closely held firms.  The rationale 
in this setting is that limiting shareholders’ liability (to the capital they have in the 
corporation) facilitates entrepreneurship through the creation of small businesses. 
 The famous case of Walkovsky v. Carlton illustrates the CSR concerns raised by 
the limited liability of corporate shareholders.113  The defendant in the case was a 
natural person who established a taxi cab enterprise with ten corporations each 
other disruptions are necessary.” (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1931, 1953–54 (1991))).
111. See, e.g., Anita Huslin, W.R. Grace to Settle Asbestos Claims for $1.8 Billion, Start New Chapter, Wash. 
Post, Apr. 8, 2008, at D01.
112. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
41–44 (1991).
113. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 416 (1966).
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owning two cabs and possessing $10,000 worth of liability insurance (the legally 
acceptable minimum for a taxi cab company at the time).  By dividing the tiny equity 
capital he had into ten separate corporations, the defendant, Mr. Carlton, achieved 
the maximum degree of bankruptcy remoteness for his personal wealth.  (Public 
companies mirror this strategy in setting up many series of subsidiaries and 
subsidiaries of subsidiaries.)  Apparently, even at that time, $10,000 worth of 
insurance was clearly an insufficient amount to cover foreseeable injuries and damages 
that would arise in the course of the taxis’ operation.  Nevertheless the court claimed 
that the plaintiff had presented no reason to depart from the rule of limited liability, 
because Carlton had done nothing wrong in dividing his enterprise into separate, 
liability-remote bits.114 
 To understand the implications of shareholders’ limited liability, more context is 
required.  First, there is no minimum capital requirement in setting up a corporation. 
Second, corporate dividend laws and fraudulent conveyance laws are almost entirely 
ineffective in keeping capital within a corporation, even where the company has 
earned profits.  Nor can tort victims look to national health insurance if they are 
injured by a corporation that has declared bankruptcy.  Creditors and tort victims 
can appeal to courts and ask them to pierce the corporate veil where the shareholders 
have committed some kind of fraud, but piercing is the rare exception.  These legal 
rules all need to be factored into the analysis of limited shareholder liability because 
they each contribute to a shortfall in corporate accountability for consumer injuries, 
environmental hazards, and mass torts.115  
 Indeed, after fifteen years of reflecting on cases in which the courts are called 
upon to pierce the corporate veil, I can find little depth of legal reasoning in them, 
beyond the policy goals of incentivizing capital formation and encouraging investment 
in the corporate form.  In essence, the legal rule quite nakedly embraces a policy 
judgment that even tort creditors’ claims will be subordinated to those goals.  There 
appears to be no deeper intellectual coherence in the limited liability case law.  The 
fact that corporate law privileges the goal of capital formation over the compensation 
of tort victims is certainly a topic of social relevance.116 
  3. CSR, Regulatory Competition, and “Efficient” Corporate Laws 
 The open-ended, enabling nature of the states’ corporate statutes and the loose 
enforcement of fiduciary constraints have been justified as being maximally efficient. 
This rationale permeates the corporate case law and academic commentary, although 
few texts or authorities explain what is meant by “efficient.”  The basic notion seems 
to be most conducive to profit maximization, without regard to distributional effects 
114. Id. at 421.
115. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 58, at 53–54, 98, 182.
116. See Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbreeding in Corporate Law, in 
Progressive Corporate Law 111 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The 
Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 
Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1413 (1992).
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(that is, issues of inequality).  In this regard, CSR discourse runs counter to the 
mainstream, efficiency rationales of corporate law, because the former presumes that 
increasing inequality is inherently problematic, and the latter does not. 
 But even accepting the growth-above-all rationale, it is not clear whether 
corporate law is efficient.  The debate is a very longstanding one in the corporate law 
literature.  The earliest claim, as presented by Professor William Carey, was for the 
inefficiency of corporate law.  Writing in the mid-70s, Carey found ample room in 
the structure of Delaware law to condemn the lax, modern, enabling approach as 
destructive of wealth.117  For example, in these years there were many high-profile 
examples of controlling shareholders taking firms public at high valuations and then 
quickly buying back the shares as the market prices dropped dramatically.  Carey and 
other scholars decried the phenomenon as exemplary of corporate law’s excessive 
permissiveness.  Widespread dissatisfaction with Delaware’s laxity even provoked the 
SEC to respond.  The Commission proposed, but then backed off from, a substantive 
fairness requirement for these transactions.118  In sum, Carey initiated the “race for 
the bottom” critique of modern corporate law’s laxness and inefficiency.
 As contemporary market theory was brought to bear on corporate law concepts, 
the “race for the bottom” view was countered by a “race to the top” counterpart.  The 
latter was articulated most famously by Ralph Winter.119  “Race to the top” theorists 
believe that the capital markets punish firms operating in suboptimal (inefficient) 
governance regimes.  Because the states benefit from chartering, they can be expected 
to compete to offer more efficient corporate laws.  In this account, Delaware corporate 
law is the winner because its law is maximally productive of corporate wealth.  
 Much is at stake for CSR in this debate.  If state corporate law panders to 
managers’ self-interest, and undermines broader wealth creation, then the entire 
corporate legal apparatus is subject to indictment and should be reformed.  In the 
alternative, if state corporate law is honed by efficient capital market forces, then 
regulatory tampering may destroy financial wealth and potentially lead to a poorer 
society.  For decades this debate has been ongoing, with evidence being marshaled 
on both sides.
 But recently the polemic has taken a different turn.  Professor Mark Roe, an 
expert on political economy, has argued persuasively that the persistent threat of 
federal disfavor or even preemption has prevented anything like a persistent movement 
towards efficient state corporate laws.120  According to Roe, the pattern of state 
corporate laws that has emerged is indeterminate from an efficiency perspective. 
 In sum, efficiency claims for the status quo in corporate legal regulation are 
eroding.  The more recent accounts present a portrait of corporate law that is 
117. See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974).
118. See Stevelman, supra note 96, at 795–97 (discussing the dual regulation of going private transactions and 
the origins of the SEC’s rule 13e-3A).
119. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal 
Stud. 251, 254–62 (1977).
120. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003).
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fundamentally path dependent, i.e., historically embedded and the product of enabled 
interest groups.121
V. THE SECURITIES REGULATION COURSE
 A. The Traditional Course
 Traditionally, the Securities Regulation course first focuses on the legal 
requirements attaching to companies’ raising capital in public sales and/or private 
placements of securities.  The aforesaid transactions are governed principally by the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“the ’33 Act”).122  The theme of supporting investors’ trust 
through disclosure is amplified as the course turns to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“the ’34 Act”).  The ’34 Act governs disclosure to investors in connection with 
tender offers and proxy voting (that is, shareholder voting for directors and in 
fundamental transactions like mergers).  It also establishes a system of periodic, 
calendar-driven reporting, and the disclosure of specified unusual events on Form 
8-K.123  All of these disclosure mandates are matched by prohibitions on material 
misstatements or omissions.  The antifraud prohibitions, including those arising 
under the ’33 Act, may be enforceable either through private litigation, SEC 
enforcement, or criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice—or some 
combination of them.  The ’34 Act reaches more broadly into various forms of 
investor protection and market regulation.  It provides for the creation of the SEC, 
the regulation of the securities exchanges, and the regulation of broker dealers, for 
example. 
 A novice encountering these two principal securities acts would assume that they 
reflected the legal status quo of 1933 and 1934, but the opposite is true.  Congress is 
constantly amending, supplementing, and partially repealing the terms of these acts. 
The same is true of the implementing regulations promulgated by the SEC.  Given 
the dynamic nature of the financial markets, the changing needs of investors, as well 
as the accretion of historic layers of law and regulation, the result is nearly unintelligible 
to novices.  This is a fundamental challenge in the teaching of Securities Regulation, 
one that becomes more formidable every year.  For example, at present—in the spring 
of 2009—there are calls for a complete overhaul of financial regulation.  Persistent 
121. For commentary on the indeterminacy of the empirical evidence on corporate law’s efficiency, see 
William J. Carney and George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9–11 (collecting and analyzing decades of empirical studies about efficiency effects from 
Delaware chartering and concluding that “[t]he results of over twenty-five years of empirical work thus 
remain inconclusive”); Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26 
Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 129 (2004) (presenting evidence for and theories of efficiency in corporate law 
and concluding that “[n]otwithstanding the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on this 
question, there is no consensus as to the desirability of the current system”); Guhan Subramanian, The 
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover 
Overreaching, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1795 (2002) (finding mixed empirical data in study of whether 
corporate managers migrate to or away from states with strong anti-takeover laws).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006).
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tinkering and periodic overhaul is the norm in the securities regulation area, just as 
it is in relation to the federal income tax code. 
 The dense statutory language and complex and oblique cross-referencing between 
the statutes and regulations make the Securities Regulation course exceptionally 
challenging.  In addition, students need to conceptualize their future work as lawyers 
in terms of both counseling (for example, in helping companies raise funding in 
securities offerings) and litigation strategy (for example, in bringing or defending 
against claims of securities fraud).  As is true in Corporations, the scope and 
complexity of the subject matter in the Securities Regulation course poses a 
fundamental challenge to students developing a comfort level with the material; this 
complexity threatens to crowd out discussion of broader themes and policy matters. 
For example, the answer to a seemingly straightforward question like whether the 
SEC is a credible monitor of fraud becomes shockingly elusive, and it is almost 
impossible to lead a discussion of the issue based on the materials in the standard 
casebooks and statutory supplements.  But without these broader issues, the course is 
almost intolerably dry and intellectually barren.  More thoughtful students would be 
driven elsewhere in the curriculum.
 B. Using Sarbanes-Oxley to Ask Broader Questions 
 So much has been written about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX” or the 
“Act”), that I will not attempt to discuss its individual provisions here.124  SOX was 
aimed, most fundamentally, at restoring investors’ and the public’s trust in the systems 
of corporate auditing and financial reporting.  The financial frauds exposed in the 
months and years after Enron’s collapse triggered deep concern about the integrity of 
corporate governance and financial regulation in the United States.125  Of course this 
is the most elementary of CSR challenges.
 SOX includes wide ranging investor protections but departs from a narrow 
understanding of shareholder profit maximization.  Many of the Act’s provisions are 
not justifiable based on short term shareholder profit maximization.126  SOX’s aims 
124. For discussion of SOX, its accomplishments, and its limitations and citation to the literature, see 
Stevelman, supra note 75.
125. See Kahn, supra note 97 (providing a discussion of the market and social conditions concurrent with 
SOX’s enactment); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1233 (2003) (focusing on the structure of Enron’s board of directors to discuss the broader theme 
of corporate culture).  
126. The greatest backlash to SOX has surrounded the expense associated with section 404 compliance. 
Section 404 requires that an issuer’s annual report include a report by management on internal controls, 
including: (i) a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate 
internal controls over financial reporting; (ii) a statement identifying the framework used by management 
to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting; (iii) management’s assessment 
of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting as of the end of the most recent fiscal 
year; and (iv) a statement that the company’s auditor has issued an attestation report on the management’s 
assessment of the internal controls over financial reporting.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 
7762 (2006).
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are broader: it targets the essential framework supporting investors’ trust in investing 
in U.S. publicly traded corporations and Wall Street.
  In this sense, SOX represents securities law enacted in the public interest.  Greater 
coherence in regard to valuation, enhanced transparency, and heightened managerial 
accountability may not produce immediately quarterly gains, but they portend longer 
term benefits both to investors and all the constituencies dependent on the sustained 
health of Main Street and Wall Street.127  This is one reason why shareholder 
advocates and business law professors accustomed to thinking in terms of shareholder 
primacy and shareholder profit maximization have characteristically been critical of 
the Act.128  The longer-term benefits of better auditing and enhanced trust may be 
too difficult to measure, whereas the costs of implementing new regulations are 
apparent.  Still, there is reason to believe that SOX’s new, heightened standards for 
internal controls will yield greater shareholder value.  After all, how can corporations 
achieve optimal productivity if they cannot measure their inventory, costs, revenues, 
profits, risk exposure, and legal compliance with speed and accuracy?129  Hence, 
SOX’s emphasis on improvements in internal controls is likely to generate core 
efficiency benefits for shareholders over the longer term.  Companies and their 
advisers probably will need time to learn to leverage the investment in information 
technology, which was hastened by new laws and regulations.130  
127. It is not the first time that Congress has signaled the need for securities laws and market regulations “in 
the public interest.”  In the Securities and Exchange Act, for example, Congress grants the SEC 
authority to promulgate disclosure provisions and other rules “in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006).  For the argument that SOX 
responded to a crisis of both governmental and extra governmental (i.e., corporate) legitimacy, see Cary 
Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 159 (2007); Kahn, supra note 
97.
128. But see John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 91 (2007); 
James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 517, 522–25 (2008) (discussing 
the legal and business community’s reception of the Act); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817 (2007).
129. See Gordon, supra note 94 (arguing that stock prices—assumedly as the result of accurate information 
disclosed to the market—yield absolutely crucial information relevant to managerial decision-making).
130. For a pre-SOX analysis of the value added by corporate and securities laws’ focus on boards’ oversight of 
internal controls and systems of information technology, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and 
Accountability, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 
505, 507 (2000) (“[T]he doctrines of fiduciary care and loyalty are both concerned fundamentally with 
directors’ and officers’ stewardship over their firms’ information. These doctrines obligate managers to 
oversee the gathering, internal and public reporting, and the ‘deployment’ of corporate information 
consistent with their firms’ and their shareholders’ best interests.”); id. at 510 (“The production of high 
quality data and the ability to organize and present such data accurately and coherently to the relevant 
corporate decisionmakers is essential to promoting optimal decisionmaking and, thus, value creation in 
the firm’s and its shareholders’ best interests.”).
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 Also promoting CSR, SOX enacts anti-corruption and heightened ethics 
standards for auditors131 and auditing firms,132 corporate boards and audit 
committees,133 CEOs and CFOs,134 and corporate general counsel.135  The Act’s 
most sweeping innovation is the creation the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (subject to the SEC’s authority), which is intended to be more independent of 
industry in its oversight of public company auditing practices.136  In this respect SOX 
represents a partial rejection of the paradigm of industry self regulation that has 
facilitated destructive corporate conduct in recent years.137
 SOX has been controversial, also, because in enacting the federal securities laws, 
Congress has generally sought to avoid trespassing in areas of corporate governance 
identified with state law.138  These areas include, for example, the regulation of 
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j) (2006) (requiring audit partner rotation every five 
years).
132. Id. § 7212 (requiring accounting firms that audit public companies to register with the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)); see also id. § 7211(c) (authorizing the PCAOB to set 
standards for public company audits and to enforce auditing rules for such firms).
133. See id. § 78j-l(m) (requiring that audit committee members be independent directors; requiring that 
audit committee have direct responsibility for appointment, compensation and oversight of the firm’s 
public auditor and requiring company to indicate whether at least one member of the audit committee 
meets the standard of being a “financial expert”).
134. Id. § 7241(a) (requiring the CEO and CFO to certify the accuracy and completeness of their company’s 
publicly filed financial statements in annual and quarterly reports, as well as the absence of known 
deficiencies in the company’s systems of internal control); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: 
Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (2002).
135. Id. § 7245 (requiring the SEC to promulgate minimum standards of professional responsibility for 
attorneys appearing before it and to require such attorneys to report to the company’s senior-most body 
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty); see also Peter Kostant, From 
Lapdog to Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 535, 548–49 (2008) (“Sarbanes-Oxley is important as a social response to the overreaching and 
greed of corporate executives and financiers . . . .  [M]y focus has long been on changing the culture of 
corporate lawyering, which section 307 has begun to accomplish.”); Giovanni Prezioso, Fiana Kwasnik 
& Lee S. Richards III, Obligations and Liabilities of Attorneys Representing U.S. Public Companies: Trends 
and Developments, 1691 PLI/Corp 329 (2008) (providing practitioners’ perspectives, regarding the 
developing federal requirements relevant to an attorney’s representation of public companies).
136. Id. § 7211 (replacing the existing system of self-regulation with a new body responsible for overseeing 
public company auditing, publicizing auditing standards, and investigating and disciplining 
noncompliant auditing firms).  The private, nonprofit status of the PCAOB is a legal curiosity and was 
recently challenged as being unconstitutional.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the PCAOB Unconstitutional?, 
235 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2006); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its 
Public/Private Status, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 975 (2005).
137. For an account of how faith in “self regulation” on the part of the SEC contributed to deregulation and, 
ultimately, the major investment houses’ massive losses from investments in mortgage backed securities, 
see Labaton, supra note 97.
138. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A 
Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 251 (2005); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573 (2005); Robert B. 
Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 99 (2003).
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boards, general counsel, internal reporting lines, and the responsibilities of CEOs 
and CFOs to shareholders.  In one of its more innovative strokes, SOX established 
bright line responsibilities for corporate general counsel and, in effect, elevated the 
general counsel’s stature to its rightful place among corporate senior officers.  In so 
doing, Congress signaled that legal compliance must be a first-order consideration in 
corporate strategy.  In a similar vein, SOX gave the audit committee clear, front-line 
responsibility for monitoring the quality of corporate disclosures.  In SOX, Congress 
also sought to reduce unseemly conflicts of interest on the part of corporate senior 
executives and, in so doing, has reinforced state corporate law’s duty of loyalty.139  In 
sum, in expanding the role of federal mandatory standards in corporate governance, 
and in promoting transparency and accountability, SOX is a congressional expression 
of CSR concerns.140  
 This is not to suggest that SOX is f lawless; indeed there are individual provisions 
in the Act that are readily susceptible to criticism.  Ultimately, SOX’s influence—its 
success or failure (as really is always true in law)—will depend on the spirit in which 
it is received by business leaders, their legal counsel, financial advisers, and auditors, 
as well as the broader community of popular opinion.  Will they carp on the Act’s 
shortcomings or accept it, despite its f laws, as an opportunity to promote greater 
corporate integrity, transparency, and accountability?141  Business law professors are 
positioned to be influential in this respect.  We educate the community of future 
corporate lawyers—lawyers who will shape norms in the corporate environment.  If 
business law professors adopt a disparaging attitude towards law and regulation, 
business leaders can hardly be expected to rise to the challenge of conforming to the 
best spirit of the law.  
 Another word on the present financial crisis is warranted.  The current financial 
crisis has illuminated the interconnectedness of markets and economies, in the United 
States and globally.  Unchecked greed and arrogance erode the basic framework of 
financial transacting, the provision of services and manufacturing, and also the 
broader social structure.  The financial, economic, and social structures that make 
up civil society are inextricably linked, as CSR studies recognize.  Meaningfully 
stringent, enforceable investor protections promote trust and integrity in financial 
139. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2006) (preventing insider trades during 
blackout periods); id. § 78m (prohibiting loans or extensions of credit to directors or officers); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A (2006) (creating whistleblower protection for employees). 
140. In a recent New York Times article, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox described the Commission’s 
reliance on investment banks’ self-regulation as a failure.  See Labaton, supra note 97 (“The last six 
months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work.”).  To be fair, there is 
criticism that self-regulation has fostered the politicization of corporate governance.  See, e.g., Steven A. 
Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 345 (2007).
141. See Lynne L. Dallas, Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, in Enron: Corporate Fiascoes and Their 
Implications 187, 201–06 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (providing an insightful 
analysis of the relationship between law and corporate ethics); Langevoort, supra note 128; Cheryl L. 
Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate Climates: What the Media Reports; What the General 
Public Knows, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 421 (2008) (discussing the reception of SOX).
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markets and institutions; hence they are likely to make a positive contribution to 
other institutions of civil society.
VI. CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY AS A UNIFYING THEME
 In the mid-1990s, when I first began to study the scope and practice of mandatory 
corporate reporting, the term “corporate transparency” was not in use.  Even the core 
presumption inherent in the term corporate transparency was not conventionally 
accepted.  State corporate law was inexact, at best, in requiring companies to report 
to their shareholders.  Public companies made the reports required by federal law at 
the times required by federal law.  In closely held firms, shareholders were relegated 
to negotiating for disclosure of corporate information.  The scope of public company 
reporting was driven by the SEC’s line item provisions in Regulation S-K and the 
requirement that what companies did report could not be materially misleading or 
incomplete.  SEC reporting was merely another form of legal compliance.  It was not 
conceived of as an ethical expectation or norm implicating broader institutional 
values.  Corporations owned their information, and like the firm itself that 
information was conceived of as being essentially private.  
 My writing, along with some other legal scholars’, criticized the narrowness and 
normative (politically conservative) bias in the SEC’s disclosure requirements 
implemented through Regulation S-K.142  As part of this, we criticized the contours 
of the reasonable investor—who, as reflected in the SEC’s reporting system—cared 
little or nothing about corporate conduct that did not impact the corporation’s 
immediate bottom line.143   
 In an article published in 1997, I highlighted the absence of required disclosure 
regarding corporate charitable contributions—especially the problematic features of 
donations to politically active nonprofits intent on moving law and policy in a 
conservative direction.144  In a separate article, I focused more broadly on the SEC’s 
minimal interest in corporate disclosure of socially significant information, including 
corporate disclosures relevant to companies’ environmental impact, their treatment 
of employees, and expenditures on lobbying and politically significant litigation.145 
 To this day, the SEC’s scheme of mandatory reporting allows companies to omit 
most of the information about its political and charitable expenditures and its 
compliance history regarding workers’ safety, consumer safety, and adherence to 
142. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107 
Yale L.J. 715 (1997); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1998).
143. This may be changing gradually in response to the SEC’s development of the concept of qualitative 
materiality.  See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (1999) (requiring 
consideration of disclosure of information that affects compliance with regulatory requirements even if 
it does not meet a five percent of earnings or revenues test).
144. See Kahn, supra note 22.  
145. See Kahn, supra note 21, at 1132–45.
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environmental standards.146  In most instances, only if gross problems develop in 
these areas, or if the problems yield large-scale litigation or penalties, is disclosure 
required. 
 The intellectual history of the concept and expectation of corporate transparency 
remains to be written. But it is clear that the term corporate transparency and the 
broad concerns it implies were imported from discussions of international law and 
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations in achieving greater clarity about the 
conduct of international bodies.  It is also clear that there has been a paradigm shift 
in domestic expectations regarding corporate reporting—one which favors 
corporations’ making fuller disclosure of their socially-salient conduct.  Scholars of 
international law and activists in the field had to accommodate themselves to the 
gaps in regulation arising from the limits of state sovereignty—limits which have 
grown more salient and significant to the conduct of multinational corporations.  In 
the international arena, pressure was earlier brought to bear on promoting disclosure, 
based on the perceived necessity of stemming corruption and promoting economic 
development.  As the pace of global financial transacting has accelerated, so too have 
concerns about corporate and financial transparency.  Hence these concerns are 
receiving greater attention in American corporate and securities law.  
 The SEC would have preferred otherwise based on its history, but the public 
reports and filings mandated by the SEC are becoming the accepted vehicle for 
expanding corporate transparency.  This is true in regard to financial, operating, 
legal, and governance-related corporate information—and increasingly CSR-related 
information.  Indeed, the continuum between socially significant and economically 
significant corporate conduct is becoming more obvious and widely accepted. 
Leaving aside voluntary, hence inevitably selective reporting on companies’ websites 
and in social responsibility reports, SEC-mandated corporate reports are increasingly 
becoming a primary information resource for  employees, creditors, regulators, the 
media, corporate consultants (such as RiskMetrics), and nongovernmental 
organizations.  Based on past practice, the SEC would have preferred to define its 
disclosure mandate more narrowly.  But its framework for corporate reporting is 
expanding investors and activists, and companies themselves, increasingly appreciate 
the link between profitability and CSR concerns. 
 In just this vein, there are several, ongoing legislative initiatives to expand socially 
relevant corporate disclosure.  For example, both the House Financial Services 
Committee and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
have been working on bills that would require multinational corporations active in 
natural resource extraction to go on record about the payments they make to foreign 
governments for natural resource rights.147  In support of this effort, on June 26, 
146. With respect to crucially important environmental reporting and disclosure, there is no other reliable 
mechanism of accessible public reporting and accountability.  See generally Wendy Wagner, Commons 
Ignorance: the Failure of Environmental Law to Provide The Information Needed to 
Protect Public Health and the Environment (2007).
147. See Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure Act, H.R. 6066 110th Cong. (introduced May 15, 
2008); Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure Act, S. 3389 110th Cong. (introduced July 31, 
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2008, I testified before the House Financial Services Committee in favor of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency and Disclosure Act (“EITDA”).  (My written 
testimony appears as Appendix A.)  The EITDA would provide a better basis for 
evaluating the payments that corporations make to foreign governments for natural 
resource rights.  Disclosure of these payments would help investors and other 
constituencies gain a better appreciation of the financial, political, and reputational 
risks inherent in international mining and extractive projects.  The disclosures would 
also benefit international nongovernmental organizations in identifying whether 
corporate payments for natural resource rights have been appropriated by corrupt 
officials and diverted from socially productive uses. 
 There is also a movement afoot to expand SEC mandated corporate reporting of 
payments to politically exposed persons, consistent with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act’s requirements and prohibitions.  The anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorism initiatives adopted under the USA Patriot Act, as well as various 
amendments to international bank secrecy laws, would also be fostered by such an 
expansion of SEC-mandated corporate reporting.148 
VII. CONCLUSION
 In this article I have endeavored to describe certain salient historical, social, and 
legal developments in the field of CSR.  In addition, I have attempted to describe the 
gulf between the traditional business law curriculum and CSR concerns, and have 
offered some new strategies and insights for incorporating CSR issues within the 
traditional business law curriculum.  
 The contemporary policy landscape is rife with examples of corporate greed and 
corruption, and many of the best scientists believe that the planet’s temperature is 
rising as a result of corporate manufacturing and global consumption.  The status of 
international human rights is increasingly of concern not only to governments, but 
also to consumers and investors, and hence to businesses.  Changes in information 
technology are making it virtually impossible for companies to cover up major 
accidents or instances of abuse, which means that the direct and indirect costs of 
such conduct will escalate for companies. 
 Business schools have become more aware of the need to help future corporate 
leaders be better prepared to confront these challenges.  And as CSR is attaining 
critical mass as a social movement, there is likely to be sustained pressure from 
consumers and investors for businesses to take fuller account of what had been 
deemed externalities.  Law schools that fail to prepare their students for this new 
environment—fail to alert them to this broader dimension of corporate counseling—
will fall behind. 
2008).
148. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 243 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  See generally Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Spotlight on Anti-Money Laundering Rulemaking, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
moneylaundering.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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APPENDIX A
Prepared Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Faith Stevelman, Professor of Law, New York Law School
June 26, 2008
 Members of Congress, Ladies and Gentleman, I am honored you have invited 
me to express my views on H.R. 6066, the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Disclosure Act (the EITDA). I am eager to answer any questions you may ask me as 
a Professor of Law specializing in corporate governance and securities regulation. 
 As you know, the Act you are vetting today would require enhanced informational 
disclosure by international extractive enterprises having a sufficient U.S. presence so 
that they or their affiliates fall under the SEC’s periodic reporting requirements.  In 
particular, the Act calls for such firms to make annual, publicly searchable reports to 
the SEC of all payments they’ve made to foreign governments for natural resources 
and extraction rights, with the exception of payments less than $100,000. 
 Such enhanced informational reporting would allow current and prospective 
investors in covered companies better to evaluate the natural resources and rights 
which their firms have obtained, as well as the costs and potential risks, legal as well 
as economic, incurred in obtaining them. In this manner, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Disclosure Act would empower individual shareholders and the 
securities market in general better to evaluate the risk/reward profile of individual 
extractive projects, and better to compare different projects within and among 
companies covered by the Act.  In addition, the Act would enhance covered 
companies’ incentives to comply with the existing legal prohibitions against off-the 
book payments and bribes, and would enhance law abiding covered companies’ ability 
to attest to the legitimate, genuinely negotiated, market-based terms of the natural 
resource rights in foreign countries. 
 The Act is consistent with Congress’ broader objectives in regulating interstate 
commerce and overseeing the system of public reporting to investors—viz., enhancing 
market efficiency, sustaining current levels of market liquidity and empowering and 
protecting U.S. investors. As would the Act, the SEC’s periodic reporting 
requirements extend to U.S. and also foreign corporations which have raised capital 
in SEC-registered public offerings, have listed securities on any U.S. exchange or 
have surpassed minimum numbers of record shareholders and asset values in the 
U.S. In regard to the Act’s substance, the disclosures it would require are, in effect, 
precise applications of already existing, more generalized disclosure mandates arising 
under the headings of “Risk Factors” and “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” as well standards of “quantitative 
materiality” endorsed by the SEC (as defined in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 
99 (dated August 12, 1999)).  
 The Act would benefit investors by facilitating their ability to value the covered 
companies’ natural resources rights and contracts, and the financial and legal risks 
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attaching to them. In addition, increasing investors’ confidence that they have the 
information reasonably necessary to price such natural resource rights and contracts 
should help lower covered companies’ costs of capital. As it would foster U.S. 
investors’ confidence in investing in international extractive industries, Congress’ 
enactment of the EITDA would help to sustain the valuable liquidity present in this 
area of the U.S. securities markets. And the additional disclosures contemplated in 
the EITDA would contribute to the markets’ ability more rationally to price the 
securities of covered companies. 
 Furthermore, the Act would help to reinforce corporate senior executive officers’ 
fulfillment of their duties of care, loyalty and good faith—that is, their fiduciary 
obligations arising under state corporation law. To clarify, by enacting the EITDA 
into law, Congress would encourage senior corporate executives to exercise their 
utmost diligence, loyalty and good faith in negotiating for and capitalizing on the 
value of their companies’ natural resources rights—since it’s logical that managers 
most efficiently and faithfully manage resources which they are obliged to account 
for publicly.  
 The disclosure which would be mandated by the Act would enhance investors’ 
ability to judge whether a covered companies’ executives have endeavored to hide or 
obscure legal and financial risks related to their foreign natural resource rights.  In 
cases where evidence of some questionable transactions or questionable reporting 
practices was evident, investors could make informed judgments about their risk 
tolerance, and the securities markets would (consistent with the concept of efficient 
markets) impound such new information into the price of the covered companies’ 
securities. Investors who concluded that their securities were overpriced or vulnerable 
to future losses could resolve to sell and “cut their losses.” In addition, by fostering 
early detection of questionable natural resource related payments or transactions, the 
Act would allow shareholders to agitate for corporate reform early on—before the 
company’s overall reputation and financial health was impaired. Furthermore, the 
disclosures mandated by the Act would help investors to evaluate the overall quality 
of the business judgment and professional integrity of covered companies’ senior 
executive officers—which should be a material factor influencing investors’ decisions 
to buy, sell or hold securities. 
 Recent domestic and international legal developments raise the litigation-related 
costs for extractive firms implicated in illicit transactions with foreign governments. 
In this regard, the Act would shed light on a facet of international corporate 
transacting that increasingly exposes U.S. investors to substantial, difficult to 
quantify litigation-related financial risk and costs. Faithful reporting under the 
EITDA would help law abiding covered companies immunize themselves from 
serious legal claims. By allowing for better verification that covered companies have 
obtained their rights to foreign-based natural resources through lawful, market-based 
negotiations and agreements with the foreign country’s officials, the EITDA would 
enhance investors’ confidence about the enforceability of their firms’ foreign-based 
natural resource rights and contracts. To clarify, the reports which would be mandated 
by the EITDA would help investors better evaluate whether their company’s rights 
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are unassailable and safe from expropriation by foreign governments claiming 
illegality, fraud or other serious abuses. Once again, the disclosure contemplated by 
the Act would foster investors’ opportunities to make informed investment choices. 
In addition, it would foster law abiding,  “market-transacting” firms’ ability to profit 
from the enhanced investor confidence they would foreseeably garner from complying 
with high ethical standards and legally mandated reporting requirements in regard 
to their foreign transactions in natural resources rights. 
 Furthermore, because covered companies’ could use good faith reporting under 
the EITDA to help attest to the propriety of their foreign transactions in natural 
resource rights, these reports might represent a low cost means of protecting these 
companies against  “globalization backlash” and the wide ranging, heightened 
conduct-based regulatory requirements it might inspire. Such expanded regulatory 
requirements would foreseeably exceed the minimal administrative and reporting 
costs which would arise under the EITDA. By negative comparison with covered, 
reporting firms, if enacted, the Act would stigmatize extractive companies which 
refused to or failed to make credible, comprehensive, verifiable disclosures of the 
data called for thereunder. Again by negative implication, investors would become 
sensitized to the greater risks associated with investing in firms which refused to or 
failed to make the disclosures contemplated by the EITDA.
 The EITDA is well drafted—it should broadly accomplish its goals at low cost. 
First, in terms of its efficacy, the Act would be extraordinarily comprehensive in its 
coverage. According to data compiled by Publish What You Pay, it would reach at 
least 90% of the major companies active in international natural resource 
extraction —that is, very few major extractive enterprises doing business internationally 
would fall outside of the Act’s mandatory disclosure requirements.  Hence, only a 
very small population of major international extractive firms would be in a position 
even to attempt to garner a comparative advantage from maintaining the 
confidentiality of their foreign transactions in natural resource rights. (The 
comparative advantage/disadvantage issue is addressed further below in this 
Testimony’s concluding remarks.) 
 In regard to the burdens it would impose, most importantly, apart from its newly 
expanded disclosure requirement, the Act proposes no new conduct requirements or 
conduct prohibitions on extractive enterprises.  Corporate acts and transactions 
which were already unlawful remain unlawful. And leaving aside (non)disclosure, 
corporate acts and transactions which were lawful remain lawful. 
 Nor, even, would the additional mandatory disclosures contemplated by the Act 
give rise to new information gathering costs for U.S. reporting firms—since any 
reasonably efficient international business would presumably have the relevant 
information called for by the Act readily at hand. For the most part, the Act would 
not even require new oversight or compliance measures or systems of verification. 
This is because the accurate reporting of transactions and maintenance of internal 
controls procedures sufficient to produce accurate corporate books and records was 
made mandatory for SEC reporting companies more than thirty years ago by 
Congress’ enactment of the books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
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Practices Act (as codified in Section 13(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act). And 
Congress has consistently reinforced this emphasis on accurate corporate reporting 
and effective corporate auditing—for example by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
and the USA Patriot Act. 
 You will undoubtedly consider certain superficially worrisome but ultimately 
insubstantial critiques of the Act. You may ask why, if disclosure is good for companies 
and shareholders, we cannot rely on corporate managers voluntarily to provide it to 
shareholders? The answer—as we are more mindful after the fall of Enron and 
WorldCom—is that managers may fail to disclose corporate information for self-
serving reasons. They may be inclined to use material nonpublic information to profit 
from trading on undisclosed or selectively disclosed good or bad news. (The limited 
budgetary resources of the SEC ensures that not all illicit trading by senior executives 
will be detected or redressed.) 
 Even more importantly, corporate senior executives would naturally prefer to 
minimize and obscure the importance of unfavorable events and transactions which 
would cast doubt on the quality of their leadership and business judgment. This 
insight points to the EITDA’s relationship to the basic architecture of corporate and 
securities law. The American corporate governance bargain is that managers and not 
shareholders get to make business decisions and investors cannot second-guess 
managers’ lawful business judgments made in good faith. The f lip side of this bargain 
however, as enforced by the federal securities laws and regulations, is that shareholders 
must be afforded detailed, accurate information about the firm’s assets, operations 
and financial condition—information illustrative of the quality of their managers’ 
decision making and professional integrity—so that they can make informed choices 
about buying, selling or holding their securities. In this regard, the informational 
disclosure contemplated by the EITDA fits neatly into the broader scheme of U.S. 
corporate and securities laws.
 Voluntary disclosure has several other essential defects.  First, of course, 
companies can simply ignore voluntary disclosure mandates. Furthermore, an 
informational environment filled with spotty, unreliable and incomplete disclosures 
undermines the usefulness of even reliable reports which investors might voluntarily 
receive.  Disclosure that is voluntary will inevitably be uneven and ad hoc—in 
essence, impressionistic. For this reason, it will not allow for meaningful 
comparability—which is to say will not accomplish meaningful transparency—
among and between extractive companies and projects.
 In addition, investors and the marketplace will inevitably discount the credibility 
and accuracy of disclosures which are merely voluntary in nature. The marketplace 
cannot adequately distinguish between earnest voluntary disclosure and self-serving, 
potentially misleading corporate “spin.” For this reason, companies cannot use 
voluntary publicity to garner the full financial benefits which would accrue from 
their making systematic, legally mandated disclosures.  Furthermore, by enacting 
the EITDA into law, Congress can signal to companies and investors, as well as 
broader constituencies, the seriousness of the principles at stake in achieving greater 
transparency in regard to international natural resource transactions. 
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 It is also crucially important to consider the enforcement mechanisms 
contemplated—and not contemplated—by the Act. In particular, the Act does not 
contemplate a private cause of action for companies’ failure to supply the information 
mandated thereunder. In this regard it is consonant with recent Acts of Congress 
which have reflected concern about the costs which may be imposed on businesses by 
vexatious private suits. 
 Nor would the broader framework of private remedies for securities fraud afford 
a basis for suits by investors. In particular, the limits and safeguards which Congress, 
the SEC and the federal courts have imposed on private investor suits for fraud—for 
example, heightened pleading requirements and proof of loss causation and 
scienter—would effectively preclude investors from using the existing antifraud 
prohibitions under the federal securities laws to bring claims alleging deficient 
EITDA reporting. 
 In the alternative, enforcement of the Act’s disclosure requirements would fall to 
the discretion of the SEC, under the oversight, in most cases, of the federal courts. 
Most notably (leaving aside cases of notorious, repeated, material disclosure 
deficiencies, gross financial frauds and instances of market manipulation and insider 
trading), SEC enforcement actions rarely have resulted in substantial corporate fines 
or penalties. In responding to perceived shortcomings in the kind of reporting 
contemplated under EITDA, the SEC has most commonly sought civil injunctions 
or obtained consent decrees prohibiting future disclosure violations. Moreover, even 
if the SEC succeeds in proving a claim of materially deficient reporting in federal 
court (monetary fines against reporting companies are unavailable in administrative 
actions), Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 establishes a three 
tiered system of fines and penalties which caps the remedies which the SEC may 
obtain—again, absent egregious facts or fraudulent or repeated reckless disclosure 
deficiencies—at $50,000 per corporate violation. 
 One final important critique of the Act should be addressed—that is, the issue of 
whether the EITDA would confer a comparative advantage on companies falling 
outside its reach. Certain features of this critique have been addressed 
previously—most importantly, that very few major, international extractive enterprises 
would fall outside of the Act’s disclosure requirements. Secondly, the above discussion 
highlighted how investors—and hence companies seeking to raise capital at efficient 
prices and the securities markets in general—stand to benefit from the disclosures 
which would be legally mandated by the Act’s passage. Furthermore, that certain 
firms might fall outside of the EITDA—even that certain firms fall outside of the 
scope of the U.S. securities laws in general—is a poor rationale for endorsing lax U.S. 
standards and requirements. That is, the United States has long been a leader in 
advocating standards of good corporate governance, and systems of accurate corporate 
reporting—and these standards and requirements have helped keep our markets 
strong and stable, have supported capital formation and protected investors’ faith in 
investing.  
 As it turns out, moreover, the comparative disadvantage argument is inherently 
shaky. Its fatal f law is that truly repressive foreign governments are unlikely to make 
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decisions about which businesses to transact with based on the presence or absence of 
the kind of reporting requirements contemplated by the EITDA. Governments 
which have histories of high levels of corruption and which are likely to demand off-
the-books payments in connection with the sale of resource rights are unlikely to be 
substantially affected by whether the terms of such transactions are subject to a 
publicly searchable filing with the SEC. 
 Second, regarding the issue of comparative disadvantage, if companies subject to 
U.S. reporting requirements pay bribes to foreign officials or engage in off-the-books 
transactions in obtaining natural resource rights, they are breaking U.S. federal laws 
which predate the EITDA. If companies cannot do business in conformity with the 
limits and standards established by Congress, then they should address this broader 
issue directly, rather than under cover of opposing the EITDA. Congress’ 
consideration of the EITDA should not become a tacit vehicle for backing away 
from the  anti-bribery, anti-money laundering and anti-corruption/national security 
laws which it has previously enacted. 
 This testimony has described how the passage of the EITDA might afford 
companies who embrace its disclosure mandates a comparative advantage in attracting 
publicly traded equity capital. Indeed, such companies should be more likely not only 
to attract public equity capital at favorable rates, but also private equity capital and 
debt financing, private and public. The reporting requirements contemplated by the 
Act are consonant with Congress’ and the SEC’s longstanding commitment to 
enhancing market efficiency and the rule of law underpinnings of free markets in 
general. In conclusion, the enactment of the Extractive Industries’ Disclosure and 
Transparency Act would advance the welfare of U.S. investors and the market for 
securities of SEC reporting companies involved in international natural resource 
extraction, while imposing little cost on the firms it governs.
